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THE LAWMAKING FAMILY
NOA BEN-ASHER*
Increasingly there are conflicts over families trying to "opt out" of
various legal structures, especially public school education. Examples of
opting-out conflicts include a father seeking to exempt his son from health
education classes; a mother seeking to exempt her daughter from
mandatory education about the perils of female sexuality; and a
vegetarian student wishing to opt out of in-class frog dissection. The
Article shows that, perhaps paradoxically, the right to direct the
upbringing of children was more robust before it was constitutionalizedby
the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters (1925). In fact, the position of US. courts on opting-out conflicts
has shifted dramatically over the twentieth century. In the early twentieth
century, parents mostly prevailed in such conflicts. Today, the state
typically prevails. Contemporary conflicts often involve public-school
management of health, sexuality, and liberal development of students
through surveys, nudges, and mandatory readings. When these techniques
infringe on familial liberty, lawmakers lack conceptual tools to respond. A
new understandingoffamilial liberty is needed
This Article offers that understanding.The approach here is based on
the idea offamily laws. Family laws are legal systems thatfamilies create
or adopt to govern their day-to-day lives. These rules exist independently
of state laws, and can be religious, such as Amish or Buddhistfamily laws,
or secular, such as feminist or vegetarian family laws. The Article
identifies three basic characteristicsoffamily laws: They are (1) general
and articulable; (2) grounded in religion, ethics, or morality; and
(3) perceived as binding by members of a particularfamily. The Article
argues that, with some limiting principles, lawmaking families should
possess a liberty to opt out of programs and policies that conflict with a
family law. Through an examination of three different types of family
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laws-religious,feminist, and vegetarian-the Article demonstrates how
the proposed approach would empower existing lawmaking families.
Almost a century has passed since the Supreme Court declared the liberty
of parents to educate their children in Meyer v. Nebraska. It is time to
breathe new lfe into this moribund liberty by empowering the Lawmaking
Family.
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INTRODUCTION

In January of 2012, the New Hampshire legislature passed a bill that
grants families the right to exempt a child for any reason from any
program offered by a public school.' With this legislation, New Hampshire
joined other state legislatures in recognizing a familial right that this
Article calls "the liberty to opt out." 2 Examples of opting-out conflicts
include a father seeking to exempt his son from health education classes
because he wants to educate him regarding health matters at home;3 a
mother seeking to exempt her daughter from mandatory education about
the perils of female sexuality with which she morally disagrees; 4 a
vegetarian parent wishing to avoid exposing her children to teachings
about the nutritional benefits of eating animals; and a Native-American
father seeking to exempt his son from a mandatory short-hair policy for
boys because it violates his tradition. 6 These diverse and sharply felt
conflicts exemplify the jurisprudence of opting out.
The current legal framework for disputes over opting out stems from
lower court interpretations of Meyer v. Nebraska,' Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,' and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 9 In these cases the Court recognized and
enforced the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
This Article shows, however, that despite this constitutional right, families
in the past four decades have typically failed when trying to opt out of
programs and policies of public education. The judicial deference to
schools, as reflected by the adoption and application of the "coercion
standard," signals the decline of the familial liberty to opt out. Courts have
ruled in favor of parents in opting-out disputes only where a program or

1. 1Veto override gives parents more control over what their kids are taught,
UNIONLEADER.COM (Jan. 4, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20120104/NEWS
04/120109976/0/news05. New Hampshire's state legislature overrode the governor's veto to pass the
bill, H.B. 542, 2011 Gen. Ct., 162d Sess. (N.H. 2012).
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that "[r]equiring students to
attend health education classes serves a legitimate state interest and is reasonably related to that
interest.").
4. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the District Attorney of
Wyoming County, Pennsylvania violated a mother's fundamental right to raise her child without
undue state interference).
5. See infra Part Ill.C.3.
6. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a child
succeeded in his free exercise claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act because his
belief was substantially burdened by the district's grooming policy).
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
8. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

9. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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policy was so coercive that the family's "entire way of life" was
threatened.1o
Should families possess broad opting-out powers, such as those
recently enacted in New Hampshire, or narrow ones, as courts in the past
four decades have consistently held? This Article proposes a middle way.
The proposed alternative centers on what I call "family laws." We know
that laws made by courts and legislators shape families, but a reverse
phenomenon is often overlooked: families also make laws." Family laws
are legal systems that families create or adopt to govern their day-to-day
lives. 12 They exist independently of state laws, and can be religious, such
as Amish or Buddhist family laws, or secular, such as feminist or
vegetarian family laws.
While the right of insular communities to sustain separate ways of life
has received judicial and scholarly attention, 13 the idea that the smaller
unit of the family also possesses lawmaking capacities, has not. Moreover,
the focus on insular communities may be misleading. Some families,
especially religious ones, do adopt laws within insular communities.14 But
other families may create and adopt family laws independent of such
communities. For example, a family may adopt a feminist family law that
requires equal child-care duties by parents, or a vegetarian family law that
prohibits killing animals. Those feminist and vegetarian family laws can
emerge outside of any identifiable community. They nonetheless deserve
legal protections. This Article proposes that when a family law is at stake,
a dissenting family should enjoy a liberty to opt out of mandatory
educational programs or policies that conflict with the established family

10. Id. at 216; see also Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989); Gruenke v. Seip,
225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000); A.A., 611 F.3d 248; Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
I1. In fact, Plato had speculated that lawmaking originated in families who legislated for
themselves. PLATO, THE LAWS, Book III (680b), at 79 (Penguin 2004). "The Athenian" quotes the
words of the poet Homer:
'No laws, no councils for debate have they:
They live on the tips of lofty mountains
In hollow cases; each man lays down the law
To wife and children, with no regard for neighbor.'
Id.
12. For further discussion of family laws as legal systems, see infra Part Ill.A.
13. See Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (holding that a statute that required every parent or guardian of a
child between eight and sixteen years to send the child to public school violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (holding that compelling Amish children
to attend public school after eight years of education violates their parents' free exercise rights);
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Forward:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4,4(1983).
14. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
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law. The liberty to opt out should be broad but not absolute; the Article
outlines some of its limiting principles.15
The remainder of this Article has three Parts. Part I introduces the core
dilemma. Most children are at the same time affiliated both with families,
of which they are current members, and with the state, of which they are
future adult citizens. This Part examines how liberal theories have treated
conflicts involving this dual identity of children. While some theorists
have prioritized the child's identity as a citizen of the liberal state, others
have argued for stronger parental authority and for a more meaningful
parental right to direct the upbringing of children.
Part II examines the liberty to opt out of public education before and
after the Supreme Court cases of Meyer and Pierce.16 This Part shows that,
perhaps paradoxically, the right to direct the upbringing of children was
more robust before it was constitutionalized. In the era before Meyer and
Pierce,judicial treatment of opting-out disputes had three main features.
First, courts framed the opting-out conflict as an attempt by teachers to
dictate the curriculum. Second, opting-out claims were usually successful,
and this was true regardless of whether those claims were grounded in
religion. Third, courts viewed public schools primarily as service
providers, rather than as governmental entities authorized to manage
health and liberal education. By contrast, since the Supreme Court
constitutionalized the right to direct the upbringing of children in Meyer
and Pierce, that right has eroded. Since then, the liberty to opt out has
changed along all three dimensions that characterized the earlier doctrine.
First, courts now frame the conflict as an attempt by parents to dictate the
curriculum. Second, religion is very significant for the success of an
opting-out claim, to the extent that secular justifications are readily
dismissed. Third, courts now view public schools not as mere service
providers, but as authoritative entities charged with governing the health
and values of the population.
Part III proposes a new approach to resolve opting-out disputes. This
approach is based on a three-part test to assess whether a "family law" is
in place. A family law should be: (1) general and articulable; (2) grounded
in religion, ethics, or morality; and (3) perceived as binding by members
of a particular family. This Part argues that the existence of a family law
should trigger a liberty to opt out of aspects of public school education,
but that this liberty is subject to some limiting principles. Finally, the

15. See infra Part ll.B.
16. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce,268 U.S. 510.
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Article applies the new proposal to past and future opting-out conflicts
involving three types of family laws: religious, feminist, and vegetarian.
I. THE CONFLICTING AFFILIATIONS OF CHILDREN

Antigone had to choose. She could bury her beloved brother who had
betrayed their country, or she could obey the command of the king to
leave the traitor's flesh to rot." Most children are simultaneously future
adult citizens of the state and members of a family.' 8 At times these two
paths merge in harmony. This Article is about the times when they do not.
Such times have captured the imagination of dramatists, philosophers,
political scientists, and jurists. Antigone and Hamlet are mythic
representations of this concept of dual identity.19 Much like Antigone,
Hamlet was commanded, albeit by a ghost, to remember his father's death,
a duty that conflicted with his duty as a citizen to obey the new king.
Antigone and Hamlet remembered and lamented the loss of a beloved
family member. And they both ended their lives performing their
perceived family obligations. Hamlet killed the uncle who had killed his
father; Antigone buried her dead brother. They both died shortly after.
This Part shows that in scholarly debates regarding such conflicts
between the two primary affiliations of children, two main positions have
crystalized. Some scholars have favored the identity of the child as a
future citizen of the liberal state. Others have favored the child's familial
identity. By examining each scholarly approach in turn, this Part
establishes the important dichotomy between what I call the "Supremacy
of the State" and the "Supremacy of the Family." This dichotomy, as Part
II will show, remains with us until this day.
A. The Supremacy of the State
The underlying assumption of those who view the state as supreme in
conflicts involving the dual identity of children is that in the context of
inculcating values, children are primarily citizens of the state and only

17. See SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, in THREE THEBAN PLAYS (Penguin Classics 2000); see also
JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE'S CLAIM (Columbia University Press 2000).
18. See, e.g, ALEXANDRE KOJEVE, OUTLINE OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF RIGHT 425-26 (2007);
BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 154 (1981); AMY GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (Princeton University Press 1987); see also Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature
Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1058 (arguing that "the state at best squanders
opportunities to more effectively advance its ends with respect to immature citizens; and at worst, fails
to meet its most basic obligations to them").
19.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET: THE TEXTS OF 1603 AND 1623 (Ann Thompson & Neil

Taylor eds., Arden Shakespeare 2006); SOPHOCLES, supra note 17.
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secondarily family members. Under this view, the liberal state is entitled,
and indeed obligated, to transmit certain values to children. Scholarship
advocating this approach is found in both socialist and liberal traditions,
although the two obviously disagree as to which values the state ought to
instill in children. 20 This Article examines scholars associated with the
liberal tradition.
Some liberal theorists have asserted that there are certain fundamental
liberal values that children as citizens of the state must learn. Amy
Gutmann's DemocraticEducation is a representative text on this point.21
Gutmann argues that all children, regardless of the wishes of parents,
should develop the skills to make their own decisions about "the good
life," and that, accordingly, all children must receive an education that
would develop critical deliberation skills.
Even private schools,
according to Gutmann, should be required to teach democratic values.
States should also be compelled by the federal government to implement
23
core values even against the will of the political majority.
Relatedly, Bruce Ackerman has maintained that lawmakers should
prioritize the autonomy of children.24 According to Ackerman, children
25
must acquire the power to make their own decisions. Ackerman thus
supports a legal rule that would mandate exposing children to various
conceptions of "the good." 26 Under his proposed regime, parents could
express their own values when raising children, but would be required to
send children to a "liberal school" that would ensure exposure to many
conceptions of "the good."27 No one, according to Ackerman, should be
allowed to indoctrinate "an uncritical acceptance of any conception of the
good life."2
Mary Anne Case has articulated a comparable approach with an
emphasis on another key liberal value: gender equality. Case argues that
"the equality of the sexes, and the instantiation of that equality in the
repudiation of 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males
and females,' are fundamental commitments on which all levels of

20. KOJEVE, supranote 18.
21.

GUTMANN, supra note 18.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. ACKERMAN, supra note 18.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44.
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government in the United States must follow through."29 Like Gutmann,
Case proposes that the commitment to liberal education must not be
limited to public education, and that "[n]ot only in public schools and
government funded educational programs, but in state-licensed private
schools and home schooling, [states] must ensure that girls and boys
receive equal opportunity."so Case further argues that mandatory readings
in school that challenge sex stereotyping should be viewed by courts as
"constitutionally required to provide to both male and female students
equal protection on grounds of sex."31 All state-sponsored educational
institutions, according to Case, are "required to refrain from promoting a
message of inequality between men and women."32
Two significant threads unite the texts of Gutmann, Ackerman, and
Case. First, all three scholars identify a liberal value that public and
private educators must transmit or apply to children. For Gutmann and
Ackerman that value is individual autonomy, with the educational goal of
facilitating a child's independent decisions about "the good life."33 For
Case, the value is gender equality, with the educational goal of promoting
gender equality and eradicating sex stereotyping. Second, all three
scholars agree that when the problem of dual identity arises and a child's
identity as a family-member conflicts with his or her identity as a future
citizen, the latter should prevail. What is important for the purpose of this
Article is that Gutmann, Ackerman, and Case agree that a parent's wish to
opt out of education about gender equality (Case) or autonomy
(Ackerman, Gutmann) deserves no protection by state or federal courts. In
times of conflict of dual-affiliation, under this view, the state is supreme.
B. The Supremacy of the Family
Others have disagreed, arguing that for the purpose of inculcating
values, children are primarily family members and only secondarily
citizens of the state. Consequently, under this view, the state should not be

29. Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and
Family Responsibility for Children, 2 UTAH L. REV. 381, 382 (2009). See also James G. Dwyer, The
Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laiws as Denials of
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (1996) ("[A]
compelling legal argument against religious exemptions to child welfare and education laws is that
they discriminate among groups of children, in the conferral of important state benefits, on an arbitrary
and improper basis-namely, the religious beliefs of other persons.").
30. Case, supra note 29, at 382.
31. Id. at 393.
32. Id.
33. As this Article points out, a child's "autonomy" for liberal thinkers tends to mean departure
from familial norms more

so than

from the norms of the liberal

state
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entitled to transmit values to children against the will of the parents. Such
approaches may appear either within liberal reasoning or as an external
critique of liberalism. For example, Stephen Gilles has argued from within
liberalism for greater rights for religious families when the interests of
parents conflict with those of the liberal state.34 According to Gilles,
"[t]here are compelling reasons to give parents not only the right to
transmit their values to their children, but also the right to reject schooling
that promotes values contrary to their own."3 Gilles argues that it is
illegitimate for the state to promote some conceptions of "the good" over
others through mandatory school programs. This argument for parental
authority does not reject liberalism as a theory, but is based instead on
liberal values such as tolerance and pluralism towards dissenting parents
** 37
and families.
In contrast, Stephen Carter's approach to the question of liberal
education seems to come from outside liberal ideology. Liberal education,
according to Carter, is simply the means that today's "group in power"
uses to indoctrinate the children "of the other side."38 Values such as
autonomy and gender equality represent the values of "the group in
power." The point is that, no matter which social group is "dominant" at
any given time, using state institutions to inculcate the children of "the
other side" is problematic. 39 According to Carter, today's liberal education
can be just as totalitarian as it was when Protestant nativists in the
nineteenth century were using public education to create a uniform way of
thinking.4 0
In sum, scholarly views on the dual identity of children can be roughly
divided into two positions: while some scholars have maintained that the
child's identity as a future citizen of the liberal state should prevail over
the child's identity as a family member (the "Supremacy of the State"

34. Stephen G. Gilles, On EducatingChildren: A ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937,
938 (1996) (observing that "parental educational rights are both ill defined and vulnerable to unduly
deferential judicial review of state educational regulation").
35. Id.
36. Id. at 938-39.
37. Id. at 940.
38. Stephen L. Carter, Parents,Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27
SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1223-24 (1997) ("The purpose is clothed in the gentle language of
preparing young people to be adult citizens of the republic, but the clothing should not distract us from
the argument underneath: good adults are, by definition, those who think the way the dominant group
does . . . .").
39. Id. at 1224 ("[T]his truth is the same whether the dominant group is nativist Protestants in the
nineteenth century, progressive intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth, anti-Communist
populists in the middle of this century, or theorists of liberalism today.").
40. Id.
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view), others have asserted that the child's identity as a family member
should prevail (the "Supremacy of the Family" view). 41 We will now see
how these two positions have played out in the jurisprudence of opting
out.
II. A SHIFT IN SUPREMACY: FROM THE FAMILY TO THE STATE

The position of U.S. courts on opting-out conflicts has shifted
dramatically over the twentieth century. In the early twentieth century,
parents mostly prevailed in such conflicts, whereas today public schools
typically prevail. The following chart maps the central features of this
transition.
FIGURE

1: THE SHIFTING JURISPRUDENCE OF OPTING OUT
How COURTS

THE SCOPE OF

FRAME THE
DISPUTE

THE FAMILY
LIBERTY TO

How COURTS
CHARACTERIZE
THE ROLE OF THE

OPT OUT

STATE

Can the

Broad and

Service Provider

(BEFORE MEYER
AND PIERCE)

teacher
intervene in
the family?

open to
nonreligious
claims

CONSTITUTIONAL
ERA

Can the
family

Narrow and
focused on

(AFTER MEYER

prescribe the

religion

AND PIERCE)

public school
curriculum?

COMMO-LA W
ERA

Governance

This Part examines the historical progression from family supremacy to
state supremacy in opting-out disputes.

41. Maxine Eichner has argued that neither the state nor parents should prevail in such conflicts.
See Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children'sEducation?: Parents,Children, and the State, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2006) ("Instead, a vigorous liberal democracy must develop a framework
for education that gives all of these interests some accommodation.").
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A. The Common-Law Era. The Supremacy of the Family
Under our form of government, and at common law, the home is
considered the keystone of the governmental structure. In this
empire parents rule supreme during the minority of their children.
-School Board Dist.No. 18 v. Thompson (1909)42
In an opting-out dispute decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in
1909, the court described the home as a "keystone of the governmental
structure." 43 This represents the prevalent position of common law courts
at the time: when schools and parents disagreed in matters of education,
the family was deemed supreme. A similar idea is manifested in Roscoe
Pound's 1916 article IndividualInterests in the Domestic Relations. Pound
writes:
Parents may and do claim not merely the society of their children,
as ministering a social pleasure, but the custody and control of
them, especially while they are of tender years, and the power to
dictate their training, prescribe their education and form their
religious opinions. All these things are claimed, as it were, as a part
of the parent's personality. 4 4
Pound's narrative captures the spirit of the era. Parents had the "power to
dictate" the training of children, as well as to "prescribe their education
and form their religious opinions."45 This authority, as Pound writes, was
understood as an essential part of the "parent's personality." 4 6 In the
common-law era, children were still understood primarily as family
members.
Three main characteristics appear in these early opting-out disputes.
First, courts consistently understood the main issue in opting-out disputes
to be whether a teacher or a school could prescribe the education of
children, rather than whether the parents could dictate the curriculum.

42. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 581 (Okla. 1909).
43. Id.
44. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REV. 177, 181
(1916).
45. Id.
46. Pound clarified that the interest of parents in children was by no means absolute. In "modem
times," he writes, courts balance the interests of the family now understood as a "social
institution" with those of the state in securing and educating "well-bred citizens for the future." Id
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Second, the success of a parental claim did not depend on its religious
grounding. Third, courts generally perceived public schools as service
providers rather than as governing agencies managing large student
populations. I discuss each characteristic in turn.
1. Main Principle:No State Intervention in the Family
The first key characteristic of the common-law era relates to the
framing of the conflict by courts. Common-law courts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries decided several opting-out
disputes involving topics such as dancing, cooking, housekeeping, bookkeeping, and geography. In contrast with contemporary courts who, as we
will see, view opting-out challenges as parental attempts to interfere with
the public school curriculum, these early courts interestingly understood
the issue to be just the opposite: whether a school or a teacher could
prescribe the education of a child.
Consider a few examples. In Morrow v. Wood,47 a twelve-year-old
child was punished for failing to attend geography lessons. 48 The child's
father had instructed him not to study geography so that he could focus on
reading, writing, and arithmetic.49 The court emphasized that it was a
"fatal error" to think that "the authority of the teacher is paramount and
controlling, and that she had the right to enforce obedience to her
commands by corporal punishment." 0 The court articulated the proper
balance between the parents and the teacher:
We do not think [the teacher] had any such right or authority, and
we can see no necessity for clothing the teacher with any such
arbitrary power. We do not really understand that there is any
recognized principle of law, nor do we think there is any rule of
morals or social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute right to
prescribe and dictate what studies a child shall pursue, regardless
of the wishes or views of the parent, and, as incident to this, gives
the right to enforce obedience even as against the orders of the
parent.

47. 35 Wis. 59 (1874).
48. Id. at 62.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 63-64.
51. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). The court further clarified that the father only "wished to exercise
some control over the education of his son, and it is impossible to say that the choice of studies which
he made was unreasonable or inconsistent with the welfare and best interest of his offspring." Id. at 66.
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This idea that a teacher cannot "prescribe" the curriculum appears in
many other early opting-out disputes. In Hardwick v. Board of School
Trustees,52 for example, parents sought to excuse their children from
required dancing lessons.
The parents argued that dancing was
"offensive to [their] conscientious scruples and contrary to [their] religious
beliefs and principles."54 The court held that children could not "be
compelled . . . to participate in the dancing exercises" 55 as long as the

survival of the state did not depend on this activity.5 6 In Rulison v. Post,57
in the context of bookkeeping, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
school has "no power to prescribe the academic or collegiate course, nor
the high school system, [and therefore] would have no power to compel
pupils to pursue such a course under penalty of expulsion."59 And in
School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, o a court held that a school
wrongfully required students to participate in singing classes.61 The
parents' attempt to opt out of singing classes was characterized as a
"reasonable selection."62 The court explained that at common law, "the
parent, and especially the father, was vested with supreme control over the
child, including its education, and, except where modified by statute, that
authority still exists in the parent."
One of the main justifications for the supremacy of the family in these
early cases was the "spirit of our free institutions." 6 4 As the Rulison court

52. 205 P. 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921).
53. Id. at 49-50.
54. Id. at 49.
55. Id. at 52.
56. Id. at 55 (discussing the importance of showing patriotism by saluting the flag and the
government's legitimate interest in requiring such an exhibition of patriotism).
57. 79 Ill. 567 (1875).
58. Id. A sixteen-year old student was expelled from school after she followed the will of her
parents and refused to study bookkeeping.
59. Id. at 572. The school therefore "could not lawfully expel [the student] from the benefits and
privileges of the school, for a refusal to comply with this requirement, and when they did so with
force, it constituted a trespass." Id at 574.
60. 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909).
61. Thompson, 103 P. at 582 ("The parent ... has a right to make a reasonable selection from the
prescribed course of study for his child to pursue, and this selection must be respected by the school
authorities, as the right of the parent in that regard is superior to that of the school officers and the
teachers.").
62. Id.; see also State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1041 (Neb. 1914) (affirming a
father's "right ... to make a reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for his child to pursue").
63. Thompson, 103 P. at 579; see also State ex rel. Bowe v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Fond Du
Lac., 23 N.W. 102, 103 (1885) (holding that a "rule or regulation requiring the pupil to bring up wood
for use in the school-room was one which the board had no right to make and enforce").
64. Rulison, 79 Ill. at 573.
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emphasized in 1875, this spirit of freedom is absent in "despotic
governments" where the state controls the education of children:
Parents and guardians are under the responsibility of preparing
children intrusted to their care and nurture, for the discharge of their
duties in after life. Law-givers in all free countries, and, with few
exceptions, in despotic governments, have deemed it wise to leave
the education and nurture of the children of the State to the direction
of the parent or guardian. This is, and has ever been, the spirit of our
free institutions .6
This articulation of freedom, almost half a century before its constitutional
affirmation in Meyer and Pierce, reflects a principle of non-intervention
by the state in matters of education. Family authority in matters of
education trumped the state's interest in educating its citizens. Likewise,
when a father wished that his twelve-year-old daughter not waste her time
in cooking classes in State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson,66 the Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected the school's claim for authority. The court
expressed some sympathy for inculcating ideals of citizenship by schools
but underscored the risk of governmental paternalism:
All this [education about the values of citizenship] is commendable
and must receive the sanction of every good citizen. But, in this age
of agitation, such as the world has never known before, we want to
be careful lest we carry the doctrine of governmental paternalism
too far, for, after all is said and done, the prime factor in our scheme
of government is the American home.69
The "American home" was considered a sacred realm where, despite good
intentions for the public welfare, "governmental paternalism" could not
reach.70 As we will see, today courts embrace a different mode of liberal
governance in which familial freedom to educate is often trumped by

65. Id.
66. 144 NW. 1039 (Neb. 1914) (explaining that the father reasoned that "the time consumed by
said class was almost a half day, thereby causing [her] to fall behind in her other studies for lack of
time.").
67. Id. at 1040.
68. Id. at 1043-44. The school district had argued that "industrial training is essential to the
welfare of the public, and it is the function of the state to require courses to be given affording
industrial training." Id. at 1040.
69. Id. at 1044.
70. See also State ex rel. Sheibley v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891) (holding that a
father who objected to a child's grammar studies was a better proxy for determining the happiness of
his fifteen year old child).
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state-mandated education about civic values and the health of future
citizens.
2. The BroadScope ofProtectedFamilialInterests
Another surprising characteristic of the early opting-out cases is that
parents could opt out on nearly any ground. So long as the parent had a
"reasonable" justification, a decision to opt out from any school activity
was generally respected. Unlike recent opting-out disputes, religion played
little or no role in most of the early opting-out cases. In Morrow, for
example, a father's opposition to his son's geography studies had nothing
to do with religion.7 The father considered the study of geography "less
necessary for his boy at that time than some other branches."72 He wished
his son to devote all his time to "orthography, reading, writing and
arithmetic," and the court endorsed this preference because it was not
"unreasonable or inconsistent with the welfare and best interest of his
offspring."n Similarly, in State ex rel. Sheibley,74 a father's objection to
his daughter's grammar lessons was validated by the court. The only
reason he provided was that it "was not taught in said school as he had
been instructed when he went to school." And in State ex rel. Bowe v.
City of Fond Du Lac,76 a court considered a father justified for instructing
his child, due to the child's poor health, to violate a school requirement
that each child carry a piece of wood to class for maintaining the
classroom fire.
Especially telling on this point is Ferguson, in which a father sought to
exempt his daughter from cooking classes. The court complimented the
father for objecting to cooking classes and opined that "we do not think a
case could be presented where a selection made by a parent would more

71. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874).
72. Id. at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 65-66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891).
75. Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Trustees of Schools v. Van Allen, 87
Ill. 303 (1877) (similarly holding that high school was not authorized to deny admissions of a student
who had passed examination in all studies, except grammar, which his father did not desire him to
study). In Thompson, it is not clear why the parents objected to singing classes-but no religious
claims were discussed by the court.
76. 23 N.W. 102 (1885).
77. Id. at 104 ("[T]he rule or regulation requiring pupils to bring up wood for use in the schoolroom was one which the board had no right to make and enforce. But if we are wrong in this view, the
relation shows a most satisfactory excuse on the part of the boy for failing to conform to it.").
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clearly be a reasonable selection than the one attempted to be made in this
case."" The court explained why the father's justification was compelling:
[A]t the time the disagreement arose the daughter was studying
music, which required not less than two hours a day. If the relator
desired to have his daughter study music, he had the unquestionable
right to have her do so, and if he thought that the taking of lessons
in music, in addition to the studies she was taking in school, as
above set out, was all she was able to carry, then, if he had a right to
make a selection at all, it must be conceded that it was reasonable
for him to select the lesson in domestic science, which took
substantially one-tenth of her entire school time, as the lesson to be
dropped, in order that she might continue her music.79
The father's preference here was not motivated by religion, morality, or
social convention-any of which might have led him to encourage the
daughter's cooking classes. Instead, the father preferred an unusual
educational path out of his "desire[] to have his daughter study music."80
The court found this preference commendable. So we see that so long as
parents provided some reasoning for keeping a child out of a class, courts
recognized their authority to do so.
In one case where religious faith was the ground for an opting-out
request, the court held for the parents by generously interpreting "religion"
to include any moral conviction of the parents. The court in Hardwick v.
Board of School Trustees8' held that objecting parents need not prove that
they belonged to any specific religious group. Choosing a course of
education for a child "is as much a question of morals, which may concern
the consciences of those who are not affiliated with any particular
religious sect as well as of those who are active members of religious
organizations opposed to that form of amusement or exercise." 82 The court
validated the parents' objection although they did not belong to a
recognizable church.
In stark opposition to more recent opting-out cases, common-law era

courts encouraged parental picking and choosing from the public-school
curriculum. So long as parents did not attempt to impose their individual
preferences on other children, any reasonable justification as to how a
child could benefit from parental restructuring of the curriculum was

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1041 (Neb. 1914).
Id.
Id.
205 P. 49 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
Id. at 53.
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welcomed and endorsed by courts. Religious liberty was only one among a
variety of reasons parents could offer. This reflects a perception of the
child as primarily a member of the family, and of the supremacy of the
family.
3. Conclusion: The Service-ProvidingState
The State has provided the means, and brought them within the
reach of all, to acquire the benefits of a common school education,
but leaves it to parents and guardians to determine the extent to
which they will render it available to the children under their
charge.
-Rulison v. Post (1875)83

We have so far examined two aspects of the early opting-out cases.
First, courts perceived the main legal issue in opting-out disputes to be
whether teachers could "prescribe" the curriculum and disregard the
"reasonable selection" of parents. Second, courts recognized a broad
decision-making power of parents that was not limited to religious claims.
The third salient characteristic of the common-law era is that courts cast
the public school as a service provider to families. In case after case,
judges reminded public school officials that their mandate is limited to
managing the schools and providing services to families, and that they are
not authorized to manage individual students.
Rulison demonstrates this point. In deciding that a sixteen-year-old
could not be required to participate in bookkeeping classes despite the
contrary wish of her parents, the court explains:
[i]n the performance of their duty in carrying the law into effect, the
directors may prescribe proper rules and regulations for the
government of the schools of their district, and enforce them. They
may, no doubt, classify the scholars, regulate their studies and their
deportment, the hours to be taught, besides the performance of other
duties necessary to promote the success and secure the well-being
of such schools. 84
The duty of school officials, as the court clarifies here, is to govern and
ensure the well-being of the school itself The emphasis here is on the
institution, not the individual students, as the province of school

83. Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875).
84. Id. at 570-71.
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governance. The student attends school as an exercise of an individual
right and not as the duty of a citizen:
[A]Il such rules and regulations must be reasonable, and calculated
to promote the objects of the law-the conferring of such an
education upon all, free of charge. The law having conferred upon
each child of proper age the right to be taught the enumerated
branches, any rule or regulation which, by its enforcement, would
tend to hinder or deprive the child of this right can not be sustained.
All rules must be adapted to the promotion and accomplishment of
this great and paramount object of the law.85
The object of the law, according to the Rulison court, is to confer the right
to be educated upon a child. Accordingly, the school's right to expel or
suspend a student can be exercised "only for disobedient, refractory or
incorrigibly bad conduct,"8 6 because:
It is by the commission of one of these acts, alone, that the pupil can
forfeit his right to the privileges of the school; and this forfeiture
can only be enforced, and the right lost, after all other reasonable
means have failed. Nor is the suspension or expulsion designed
merely as a punishment of the child, but principally as a means of
preserving order and the proper government of the school.
The only legitimate reason to expel or suspend a child, according to this
court, is to preserve the order and government of the school. The child inand-of-herself was not the legitimate object of governance. Governing
children was the domain of the family. Similar reasoning appears in
Ferguson:
[Iff the [father] desired that his little girl should take music lessons
from a private instructor and devote an hour or two a day to that
study, in lieu of the modern lesson of cooking in the public school,
we are unable to see how excusing her from that lesson could have
interfered with the discipline of the school.8"
So long as the "discipline of the school" was not injured by the student's
opting out of cooking class, school officials could not mandate her
participation in those classes against the wishes of her father. Similarly, in
Sheibley, the court explained that "[tihere is no good reason why the

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1044 (Neb. 1914).
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failure of one or more pupils to study one or more prescribed branches
should result disastrously to the proper discipline, efficiency, and wellbeing of the school." 89
Schools in the common-law era were viewed as service providers
whose authority stems from the delegation of parents. Thus, as long as all
students have access to the service provided by the state, some can opt out
of the full range of services. The Oklahoma Supreme Court quotes
Blackstone for further support of this position:
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco
parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent
committed to his charge, viz., that of restraint and correction, as
may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is
employed. 90
The school, according to Blackstone, derives its authority from the
delegation of the father. Accordingly,
it is idle to say the parent, by sending his child to school, impliedly
clothes the teacher with that power, in a case where the parent
expressly reserves the right to himself, and refuses to submit to the
judgment of the teacher the question as to what studies his boy
should pursue. 91
The school, under this theory, could act only within the scope of its
delegation, and that scope was determined solely by the father. 92 This, we
will later see, is the opposite of contemporary opting-out cases where
management, health, and education of the general population are inherent
to public-school education.
In sum, three key components typify opting-out disputes in the
common-law era. First, courts framed the opting-out conflict as an
intrusion into the parental domain of education. Second, the right to opt
out was not limited to religious claims-any reasonable parental interest
could be validated by courts. Third, courts viewed public schools as

89. State ex rel. Sheibley, 48 N.W. 393, 395 (Neb. 1891) (adding that "so long as the failure of
the students thus excepted to study all the branches of the prescribed course does not prejudice the
equal rights of other students, there is no cause for complaint.").
90. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 581 (Okla. 1909) (quoting Blackstone)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
9 1. Id.
92. I will later return to the issue of how lawmaking authority is allocated in various lawmaking
families. See infra Part Ill.
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service providers vested only with the power to maintain order and
discipline of the school-but not with the authority to manage individual
students. The constitutional era, while formally recognizing the parents'
role in decision-making, began a period that slowly eroded the supremacy
of the family.
B. The ConstitutionalEra: The Supremacy of the State
In Meyer v. Nebraska,9 3 decided in 1923, a school-teacher was
prosecuted in the state of Nebraska for teaching German to a ten-year-old
in violation of a statute that prohibited the teaching of "any subject to any
person in any language other than the English language."94 The Court
struck down the statute, reasoning that the teacher's right to teach German
"and the right ofparents to engage him so to instruct their children ... are
within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment." 95 The Meyer Court
thus located a parental liberty interest in the Due Process Clause.
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 6 the Court further
elaborated the meaning of this new constitutional right.97 This time, the
plaintiff, which provided Roman Catholic religious instruction and moral
training, challenged a law that required every parent or guardian of a child
between eight and sixteen years to send the child to public school. The
Court struck down the law, announcing that:
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.98

93. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
94. Id. at 397.
95. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). The Court famously declared:
[L]iberty ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399.
96. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 535.
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With these famous words, the Pierce Court declared the liberty interest of
parents to include the right to choose private education over public
education. More broadly, the Court clarified that the state cannot
legitimately attempt to "standardize its children" because the child is not
the "mere creature of the state." Meyer and Pierce are considered
landmark victories of individual rights against state coercion. 99 Although
they do not mention the constitutional right to privacy, they are considered
its origins.100
Meyer and Pierce were decided against the backdrop of what the Court
viewed as totalitarianism. The Meyer Court differentiated constitutional
democracies from Plato's totalitarian vision of society.101 The Court
emphasized that totalitarian ideas are "wholly different from those upon
which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any
Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state
without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution." 0 2 The
explicit message here is that liberal democracies protect parents from
policies that attempt to shape children in a uniform way. Parents possess a
liberty interest in the education of children.
As Jed Rubenfeld has shown, in Meyer and Pierce "the state had gone
much further in the effort . . . to 'coerce uniformity."'"os The meaning of

the legislative ban on foreign languages in Meyer was "partially to ban
'foreign thinking' and 'foreign ideas' from [students'] consciousness." 104
The Court thus responded to "[t]he threat of the state using the public
schools to inculcate one acceptable way of thinking-'our' way, as
opposed to 'foreign' ways."os In Pierce, the threat of totalitarianism was
even more immediate because the state had prohibited all private

99. But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 997 (1992) (arguing that Meyer and Pierce "were
animated ... by another set of values-a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a classstratified society, and to a parent's private property rights in his children and their labor").
100. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 743 (1989).
101. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02 ("Plato suggested a law which should provide: 'That the wives of
our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his
own child, nor any child his parent . . . . The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents
to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter;
but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in
some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be."').
102. Id. at 402.
103. Rubenfeld, supra note 100, at 786; see also Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray,
Disestabhlishingthe Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1265 (2010) ("Meyer may be read to adopt the kind
of antitotalitarian argument for institutional and ideological diversity.").
104. Rubenfeld, supra note 100, at 786-87.
105. Id. at 787.
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education.10 6 The anti-totalitarian underpinning of the liberty interest
announced in Meyer and Pierce is crucial to understanding contemporary
opting-out disputes.
With these cases, the Supreme Court appeared to announce a broad
liberty interest for parents. But over the course of what I call the
"Constitutional Era," lower courts interpreted this principle in ways that
narrowed its applications.
As illustrated in Figure 1 above,' 7 there are three key components to
the opting-out disputes of the constitutional era. First, in contrast with the
common-law era, courts today typically understand the main issue to be
whether a parent can prescribe the school curriculum. Second, in
contemporary opting-out disputes, parental requests that are not based on
religious liberty are generally less successful. Third, unlike the early cases
where courts viewed public schools as service providers, today courts
view public schools as autonomous entities in charge of governing student
populations and producing future generations of citizens.
1. Main Principle:No FamilyIntervention in the State
Public education in the United States has undergone a process of
secularization in the twentieth century.108 It is therefore unsurprising that
many opting-out disputes in the past four decades have involved religious
objections to mandatory programs and policies. The most well-known of
these challenges is Wisconsin v. Yoder.10 9 In Yoder, parents who practiced
the Amish and Mennonite religions were convicted of violating the state's
compulsory public-school attendance law.1 10 The parents sought to opt out
of public education, arguing that mandatory public-school education past
the eighth grade violated their religious beliefs and threatened their entire
religious way of life."' The Court accepted the state's educational

106. Id.; see also Carter, supra note 38 (arguing that Meyer and Pierce represent an implicit
argument about social contract: parents can freely educate their children about religion because they
have never delegated that right to the state).
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (Princeton
University Press, 2005); Marc 0. DeGirolami, The Problem of Religious Learning, 49 B.C. L. REV.
1213, 1217 (2008) ("[B]y the mid-twentieth century, the conviction that Protestant Christianity was the
exclusive wellspring of rectitude had quite properly been by and large repudiated, at least by the
Supreme Court. And yet a robust civic and moral education remained one of the public schools'
raisons d'tre."); DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN
EDUCATION (1974).

109. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
110. Id.
111. Id. at221.
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goals,'" but held that the Amish values of reliability, self-reliance, and
dedication to work can indeed prepare schoolchildren for productive adult
citizenship.' 13
Yoder is in the tradition of the Supreme Court's broad articulation of
the right to opt out, but, like Meyer and Pierce, Yoder has been narrowly
construed by later courts. Parents and families who have attempted to rely
on this case have mostly failed. Since Yoder, parents have sought to opt
out in two primary educational areas: (1) health and sexuality, and
(2) social values. In a majority of these cases, familial opting-out
challenges under the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, both religious
and nonreligious, have been unsuccessful.
a. Health and Sexuality
Struggles to exempt a child from classes or programs involving health
or sexuality have been characterized by courts as attempts to prescribe the
public-school curriculum. For example, in Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Productions,114the parents of high-school students complained when their
children attended a mandatory school-wide HIV-awareness program.
The First Circuit held that parents cannot "dictate the curriculum" in
public schools, 16 and that the right to direct the upbringing of children is
violated only by "foreclosing the opportunity of individuals and groups to
choose a different path of education."
The court distinguished
mandatory HIV education from the claims at issue in Meyer and Pierce:
We think it is fundamentally different for the state to say to a
parent, "You can't teach your child German or send him to a
parochial school," than for the parent to say to the state, "You can't
teach my child subjects that are morally offensive to me." The first

112. Id.
113. Id. at 224-25 ("There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qualities of
reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to find ready markets in today's society.
Absent some contrary evidence supporting the State's position, we are unwilling to assume that
persons possessing such valuable vocational skills and habits are doomed to become burdens on
society should they determine to leave the Amish faith. . .
114. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
115. Id. at 529. The parents invoked "their privacy right to direct the upbringing of their children
and educate them in accord with their own views," and their children claimed that the sexually explicit
nature of the event humiliated and intimidated them. Id. at 529, 532.
116. Id. at 533 ("The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle that the state cannot
prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program .... We do not think, however, that this
freedom encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curriculum at the public school
to which they have chosen to send their children.").
117. Id.

HeinOnline -- 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 385 2012

386

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:363

instance involves the state proscribingparents from educating their
children, while the second involves parents prescribing what the
state shall teach their children."1 8
The logic here is crucial. The court holds that the state cannot "proscribe"
parents from educating their children, and parents cannot "prescribe" what
the state "shall teach their children." The court explains:
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate
individually what the schools teach their children, the schools
would be forced to cater a curriculum for each student whose
parents had genuine moral disagreements with the school's choice
of subject matter. We cannot see that the Constitution imposes such
a burden on state educational systems, and accordingly find that the
rights of parents as described by Meyer and Pierce do not
encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in
the public schools.' 19

The court wishes to avoid schools having to "cater the curriculum" to each
student whose parents disagree. But it is important that the parents in this
case did not seek to dictate or cater the school curriculum for other
children: they only sought to exempt their own children from parts of the
curriculum. They were attempting what this Article calls an "opt out."
Nonetheless, the recurring theme in many such cases is that opposing
parents seek "to restrict the flow of information in the public schools" and
"to dictate the curriculum." 20
This is a fascinating reversal of the opting-out cases: in the early cases,
schools that did not accommodate parental opting-out requests were
criticized by courts for prescribing the curriculum. Now the roles have
flipped. The protective sword of Meyer and Pierce has turned on parents.
This reversal is also apparent in Leebaert v. Harrington,121where a father
sought to excuse a child in the seventh grade from mandatory healtheducation classes.12 2 The school refused and a lawsuit followed.1 23 The
Second Circuit held for the school, 124 following the First Circuit's position
that parents do not have "a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the

118. Id. at 533 34 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 534.
120. Id.
121. 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 137 (noting the father argued that, "being sufficiently educated in health, sex, and
behavioral issues, [1] feel it is more appropriate that as they enter adolescence I handle this facet of my
children's personal growth at home.").
123. Id.
124. Id. at 145.
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curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their
children."125 The court explains:
Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny do not begin to suggest the
existence of a fundamental right of every parent to tell a public
school what his or her child will and will not be taught ....
[R]ecognition of such a fundamental right-requiring a public
school to establish that a course of instruction objected to by a
parent was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest
before the school could employ it with respect to the parent's
child-would make it difficult or impossible for any public school
authority to administer school curricula responsive to the overall
educational needs of the community and its children.126
In contrast with the common-law era cases, the court vests the school with
decision-making power regarding the "overall educational needs of the
community and its children."' 2 Leebaert and Hot, Sexy & Safer
Productionsexemplify the current narrow interpretation of Meyer, Pierce,
and Yoder.
Parents have also failed in several efforts to opt out of health-related
surveys. In Fields v. Palmdale,128 elementary school children participated
in a survey that included topics such as the frequency of "thinking about
having sex" and "about touching other peoples' private parts." 29 The
Ninth Circuit framed the issue as "whether the parents have a
constitutional right to exclusive control over the introduction and flow of
sexual information to their children,"13o and held that they do not.131
Parents may not prescribe the curriculum, 132 and "[s]chools cannot be
expected to accommodate the personal, moral or religious concerns of
every parent."13 3 A public school can provide students "with whatever

125. Id. at 141 (quoting Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d at 533-34) (internal citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. Id. at 141.
127. Id.
128. 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
129. Id. at 1200.
130. Id. at 1203.
131. Id. ("[N]o court has ever held that parents have a specific fundamental right 'to control the
upbringing of their children by introducing them to matters of and relating to sex in accordance with
their personal and religious values and beliefs.").
132. Id. at 1205-06 ("Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny 'evince the principle that the state cannot
prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program,' but they do not afford parents a right to
compel public schools to follow their own idiosyncratic views as to what information the schools may
dispense.").
133. Id. at 1206.
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information it wishes to provide, sexual or otherwise, when and as [it]
determines that it is appropriate to do so."1 34 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that "the right to limit what public schools or other state actors may tell
their children regarding sexual matters, is not encompassed within the
Meyer-Pierce right to control their children's upbringing and
education."
Similarly, in C.N v. Ridgewood Board of Education,
parents challenged their children's participation in a survey involving
issues such as drug and alcohol use, sexual activity, suicide, and personal
associations. The court held that a survey, even if involuntary, is not
unconstitutional because it did not "strike at the heart of parental decisionmaking."' 37
Parents have also repeatedly failed in challenges to school-sponsored
birth-control programs. For example, Parents Unitedfor Better Schools v.
Philadelphia Board of Education38 involved a condom-distribution
program that addressed the concern that "adolescent pregnancy, sexually
transmitted diseases, and HIV infection are epidemic among school age
youth."13 9 Parents in this case had the choice to opt their child out of the
program,140 but students whose parents did not actively do so were
supplied with condoms. The parents claimed that the policy violated their
right to direct the upbringing of their children. 141 But students today are
primarily understood to be citizens of the state, and the goal of the school
is to make them happier and healthier. The Third Circuit concluded that
"the policy neither coerces parental or student participation nor offends the
rights of parents to direct the care and custody of their children." 142
There was no opt-out provision in the condom-distribution program
challenged by the parents in Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth.143
The court concluded that the condom-distribution program was "in all

134. Id.
135. Id. at 1207.
136. 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
137. Id. at 184-85 ("While the Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to parental
decisions regarding certain matters, our review of these cases prompts us to conclude that the decision
whether to permit a middle or high school student to participate in a survey of this type is not a matter
of comparable gravity.") (citation omitted).
138. 148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998).
139. Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 264.
141. Id. at 274. The school board's policy stated that "[t]he Board of Education firmly believes
that successful pursuit of the mission of promoting a healthy lifestyle for all adolescents depends upon
the cooperation of a broad spectrum of the Philadelphia community, including schools, families,
religious institutions, health care providers, social service agencies, businesses, government, and
media." Id. at 263 (quoting Policy Number 123, "Adolescent Sexuality").
142. Id. at 262.
143. 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995).
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respects voluntary and in no way intrudes into the realm of constitutionally
protected rights [and that] no threshold demonstration of a coercive burden
has been made."l 44 The court clarified that "[t]he type of interference
necessary to support a claim based on an alleged violation of parental
liberty appears to be that which causes a coercive or compulsory effect on
the claimants' rights."1 45 Condom-distribution programs are viewed as
voluntary since the program does not actually require the students to
obtain condoms.146 Thus, although religious or moral sensibilities of
parents may be offended, the coercion standard is not met because
"parents are free to instruct their children not to participate."1 47
By the end of the twentieth century, the perception of children flipped.
Through the lens of this reversal in courts' responses to opting-out
disputes, it seems that minors are now viewed primarily as future citizens
and secondarily as family members. Parents have very limited opting-out
powers. Teaching students about HIV, mandating health surveys, and
distributing contraceptives are all within the current mandate of publicschool education.
b. Social Values
Two types of opting-out conflicts involve what we might call "social
values." First, school dress codes and grooming policies, which are often
justified by schools as minimizing socioeconomic gaps and reducing dropout rates, have been challenged by parents.14 8 Second, teaching liberal
values such as gender equality and same-sex marriage in the public-school
setting has been the source of intense conflicts between schools and
dissenting parents.
i.

Opting Out of Dress Codes and Grooming

Parents have unsuccessfully attempted to exempt children from dress
codes and grooming policies. Such was the case in the Fifth Circuit's

144. Id. at 583.
145. Id. at 585.
146. Id. at 586 ("The students are not required to seek out and accept the condoms, read the
literature accompanying them, or participate in counseling regarding their use. In other words, the
students are free to decline to participate in the program.").
147. Id.; see also Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980) (upholding a clinic's programs, in a
case brought by the parents of a sixteen year-old female who received contraceptives from a public
family planning clinic).
148. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Forney, 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
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decision in Littlefield v. Forney,149 where parents challenged a districtwide mandatory uniform policy that had an opt-out provision only for
families "with 'bona fide' religious or philosophical objections to the
wearing of a uniform." 5 o Parents claimed that the narrowness of the
provision violated their fundamental right to control the upbringing and
education of their children.151 The court validated the uniform policy
because it furthers "the legitimate goals of improving student safety,
decreasing socioeconomic tensions, increasing attendance, and reducing
drop-out rates."1 52 Similarly, in Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School
153
District,
a father and his daughter challenged a middle school dress
54
code.1 The father claimed that the code violates his right to control the
dress of his child, and his daughter explained that she wanted to wear
clothes that "look nice on [her], that she feel[s] good in, and that express
her individuality". 5 5 The Sixth Circuit reiterated the idea that parents
cannot prescribe the public school curriculum:
While parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to
send their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental
right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child.
Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school day,
school discipline, the timing and content of examinations, the
individuals hired to teach at the school, the extracurricular activities
offered at the school or, as here, a dress code, these issues of public
education are generally "committed to the control of state and local
authorities." "
This language is especially helpful for understanding the current role of
public schools. The parents' right to direct the upbringing of children,
according to the Sixth Circuit, ends when parents decide to send their child
to public school. Thus, efforts of parents to opt out of dress codes and
grooming policies usually fail as an intervention in the prerogative of
public schools. 5 1

149. Id.
150. Id. at 281.
151. Id. at 282.
152. Id. at 291.
153. 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005).
154. Id. at 385 (The dress code was designed to "create unity, strengthen school spirit and pride,
and focus ... attention upon learning and away from distractions.").
155. Id. (alterations in original).
156. Id. at 395 96 (emphasis added).
157. See id.
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There are exceptions, however. In a telling contrast with Blau, the Fifth
Circuit recently held for parents in a religious challenge to a dress code in
A.A. v. Needville Independent School District. A Native American
family challenged a sex-based grooming policy that required boys to wear
their hair short. 59 The boy and his parents wanted the boy to wear his hair
in two long braids. 160 The Fifth Circuit granted the family's opting-out
request because the child "demonstrated a sincere religious belief in
wearing his hair uncovered-visibly long."' 6 1 The court dismissed the
school's hygienic and safety concerns, 162 and reminded the school district
that elementary school, "even in its most authoritarian form, is neither a
military operation nor an incarceration facility." 6 3 The court conceded
that the identity of boys as future citizens justifies a strict grooming code,
but noted that there are exceptional cases in which a child's identity as a
member of a religious community will prevail. The family succeeded in its
free exercise claims under state law.16 4
Not all successful parental challenges involve religious grounds.
Another case regarding teen sexuality and gender expression was decided
recently by the Third Circuit in Miller v. Mitchell.16 5 Here, a district
attorney presented teens suspected of "sexting" with the choice either to
attend an educational program on gender and sexual expression or to face
felony child pornography charges.166 One of the goals of the educational
program was to educate girls about the dangers of female promiscuity.
The mother of one of the teens objected and sought to opt out of this
program, claiming that it "contradict[s] the [feminist] beliefs she wishes to

158. 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010).
159. Id. at 253.
160. Id. at 254.
161. Id. at 262 (emphasis in original). The court decided the case on state free exercise grounds
only, under a strict scrutiny test. Id. at 272.
162. Id. at 268-69 ("[T]he District does not dispute that A.A.'s hair is kept clean, nor does it
explain why its 'one braid down the back' exemption would foster hygiene as compared to two braids
.... To the extent A.A.'s long hair poses a cognizable safety concern, it is of course far from those
associated with a knife of any size or shape.").
163. Id. at 271.
164. See id. at 272. The court did not address the constitutional claims because the holding under
Texas law provided a non-constitutional basis sufficient to support its decision.
165. 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
166. Id. at 144.
167. Id. ("The education program was divided into a Female Group and Male Group. The 'Female
Group' syllabus lists among its objectives that the participants 'gain an understanding of what it means
to be a girl in today's society, both advantages and disadvantages.' In the first session, students are
assigned to write 'a report explaining why you are here,' '[w]hat you did,' '[w]hy it was wrong,' '[d]id
you create a victim? If so, who?,' and how their actions "affect[ed] the victim[,] [t]he school[, and] the
community."') (alterations in original).
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instill in her daughter."16 8 She particularly objected to the education
program's lessons about the moral wrongfulness of her daughter's
actions. 169 The court agreed that the district attorney "impermissibly
usurped and violated [the mother's] fundamental right to raise her child
without undue state interference."' o One explanation for this exceptional
decision is that the educational program was initiated and administered by
a district attorney. Because criminal prosecutors are not typically
authorized to educate the public, the district attorney's actions were
viewed by the Third Circuit as impermissibly coercive.
These two exceptional parental victories involved school attempts to
normalize teen gender expression. In both cases the circuit courts informed
public officials that they had overstepped their authority. Such cases
represent the kind of recognition and validation of religious and secular
family laws proposed and discussed in Part III.
ii.

Opting Out of LiberalEducation

Mandatory education about liberal values has generated intense conflict
between schools and parents. In the well-known case of Mozert v.
171
Hawkins County Board of Education,
students were required to use a set
of reading textbooks designed to help them "develop positive values" and
"learn to become good citizens in their school, community, and
society."l72 Students who refused to read the required books were
suspended. 73 Several parents sued, claiming that the readings involved
materials that contradicted their religious convictions. 174 One father
objected to "[gender] role reversal or role elimination, particularly
biographical material about women who have been recognized for
achievements outside their homes."17 Another complained about

168. Id. at 150.

169. Id.
170. Id. at 151 ("An essential component of Jane Doe's right to raise her daughter-the
responsibility to inculcate moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship,' was
interfered with by the District Attorney's actions. While it may have been constitutionally permissible
for the District Attorney to offer this education voluntarily ... he was not free to coerce attendance by
threatening prosecution.") (citation omitted).
171. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing the district court's decision that the reading
requirement violated the constitutional rights of the objecting parents and students).
172. Id. at 1060. The readings were executed under a requirement of a Tennessee statute to
include "character education" in the curricula. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1007 (2009).
173. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
174. The plaintiffs did not belong to a particular church or denomination, but they considered
themselves to be born again Christians. The sides agreed that their beliefs were sincere "and that
certain passages in the reading texts offend[ed] those beliefs." Id. at 1061.
175. Id. at 1062.
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"passages that encourage children to make moral judgments about whether
it is right or wrong to kill animals."176 The Mozert court denied the opt-out
requests, and underscored the key role of public schools in preparing
children for adult citizenship.' The court held that the readings are not
coercive,17 and that "the evil prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause [is]
... governmental compulsion either to do or refrain from doing an act

forbidden or required by one's religion, or to affirm or disavow a belief
forbidden or required by one's religion." 79
The First Circuit reached a similar result in Parker v. Hurley,so a case
involving readings about families that are not based on heterosexual
marriages.'' Some parents sought to opt out of those readings, 82 alleging
that they "indoctrinate young children into the concept that homosexuality
and homosexual relationships or marriage are moral and acceptable
behavior."' 8 3 But the court again asserted that parents cannot prescribe the
public school curriculum.1 84 As in Mozert, the Parker court validated the
supremacy of the state by clarifying that it is legitimate for the state to
"attempt to inculcate values by instruction,"' 85 and that it is the role of
public educators to prepare students for citizenship.186
In sum, a conceptual shift in the opting-out jurisprudence of courts has
occurred. In the common-law era, the family was considered supreme and
could therefore opt out of undesired aspects of public school education. In

176. Id.
177. Id. at 1060, 1071 ("critical reading is an essential skill which ... children must develop in
order to ... function as effective participants in modern society .... Teaching students about complex
and controversial social and moral issues is just as essential for preparing public school students for
citizenship and self-government as inculcating in the students the habits and manners of civility.").
178. Id. at 1065-66.
179. Id. at 1066 (concluding that no compulsion existed in this case).
180. 514 F.3d 87(1st Cir. 2008).
181. Id. The following books were contested by the parents: ROBERT SKUTCH & LAURA
NIENHAUS, WHO'S IN A FAMILY? (Tricycle Press 1997) (describing various kinds of families,
including same-sex families); NANCY GARDEN, MOLLY'S FAMILY (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2004)
(teaching about different kinds of families); LINDA DE HAAN & STERN NIJLAND, KING AND KING 9293 (2003) (telling the story of a prince who is ordered to find a princess, but eventually falls in love
with and marries a prince).
182. The parents invoked the right to privacy, the right to raise their children, and the free exercise
of religion. They also argued that defendants' conduct violated MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 32A, a
statute which requires that parents be given notice and an opportunity to exempt their children from
curriculum which "primarily involves human sexual education or human sexuality issues." Parker,
514 F.3d at 92.
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. at 103.
185. Id. at 105.
186. Id. at 95 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-85 (1986)).
Therefore, in Massachusetts, "it is entirely rational for ... schools to educate their students regarding
that recognition [of same sex marriages]." Id.
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the constitutional era, by contrast, the law has flipped. Despite some
exceptions discussed above," in conflicts involving health education, sex
education, dress codes, grooming, and education about social values,
courts have generally denied familial opting-out requests.
2. The Narrow Scope ofProtectedFamilialInterests
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if
it is based on purely secular considerations ....
-Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) m
One of the indications of the supremacy of the state in the
constitutional era is the significant narrowing of the scope of protected
parental interests. In contrast with the common-law era where we saw a
broad range of protected familial interests, an important distinction
crystalized in the constitutional era: secular and religious justifications of
dissenting families are now treated differently. Courts time and time again
have clarified that secular convictions of parents deserve less
constitutional protection than do religious ones.19 So whereas the success
of both religious and secular claims has significantly declined in the
constitutional era, secular objections have fared worse.
Opting-out disputes that are grounded in religion usually involve a
combination of Free Exercise and Due Process claims.190 In such cases,
courts have construed Yoder quite narrowly, placing considerable weight
on the Court's finding that the "entire way of life" of religious families
was threatened by Wisconsin's education policy.' 9' In Mozert, the Sixth
Circuit dismissed opting-out requests from mandatory readings by

187. See A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 268-69 (5th Cir. 2010); Miller v.
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
188. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
189. Cf id. at 216 ("Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected
the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a
religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.").
190. Courts have also dismissed several attempts to raise the level of scrutiny based on the hybrid
nature of Fourteenth and First Amendment claims. See Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise
of Religion and Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of
Children, 103 MIcH. L. REv. 2209 (2005); but see Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89
F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996) (adopting the hybrid theory and dismissing a secular claim based on the
rational basis test).
191. Yoder, 406 U.S. at216.
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distinguishing the plaintiff parents from the parents in Yoder.19 2 The court
explained that whereas in Yoder the parents faced a "very real threat [of]
undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist
today,"' 93 here "[n]o such threat exists."' 94 Likewise, in Hot, Sexy & Safer
Productions, the First Circuit found that a "one-time compulsory
attendance at the [HIV education] Program" did not threaten the dissenting
families' "entire way of life." 95 In Leebaert, the Second Circuit also
distinguished a father's request to opt out of health education from the
claims of the parents in Yoder:
[B]ecause of the comparative breadth of the plaintiffs' claim in
Yoder, we do not think that [the plaintiffs] free exercise claim is
governed by that decision: He has not alleged that his community's
entire way of ife is threatened by [his child's] participation in the
mandatory health curriculum. [He] does not assert that there is an
irreconcilable Yoder-like clash between the essence of [his]
religious culture and the mandatory health curriculum that he
challenges. 196
Similarly, in Parker, the court held that plaintiffs' entire "way of life" was
not significantly endangered when their children were exposed to samesex relationships through reading in public school. 197 The failure of these
attempts to opt out reflects the high threshold to which courts have held
plaintiffs, even those with religious claims, in the last four decades.
Secular claims are usually brought solely on Due Process grounds, and
have fared even worse than religious claims. Indeed, as highlighted above,
almost all secular opting-out challenges after Yoder have been dismissed
by courts. 98 In Herndon v. Chapel Hill-CarrboroBoard of Education,199
for example, the Fourth Circuit upheld a high-school's requirement to

192. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that
Yoder "rested on such a singular set of facts that we do not believe [the decision] can be held to
announce a general rule that exposure without compulsion to act, believe, affirm or deny creates an
unconstitutional burden.").
193. Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id.
195. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).
196. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) ("[Plaintiff]
asserts that the mandatory health curriculum conflicts with his belief that 'drugs and tobacco are [not]
proper subjects that I want my son's school to teach' and his view that 'sex before marriage is ...
something I do not want my sons to be involved in.' [Plaintiffs] 'free exercise claim is [thus]
qualitatively distinguishable from that alleged in Yoder."') (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
197. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 100 (1st Cir. 2008).
198. See supra Part II.B.1.
199. 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996).
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perform community service. The court held that a community service
requirement "does not intrude on the students' freedom from involuntary
servitude, their right to privacy, or their parents' right to direct their
upbringing and education,"200 and reasoned that "[e]xcept when the
parents' interest includes a religious element ... the Court has declared
with equal consistency that reasonable regulation by the state is
permissible."2 01 Other courts have dismissed secular claims without
explicitly invoking the hierarchy between religious and secular claims. In
Blau, for example, the Sixth Circuit easily dismissed a father's attempt to
exempt his daughter from a school dress code when it inhibited her
"ability to wear clothing that she likes."202 Even in the exceptional case
where the Third Circuit upheld a parent's secular-feminist case, the court's
reasoning reflects that the perceived coerciveness of the program was in
large part connected to it being offered as an alternative to criminal
203
prosecution.
Part III criticizes this hierarchy between secular and religious "ways of
life" and offers a new way to articulate familial liberties.
3. Conclusion: The GoverningState
The role and purpose of the American public school system were
well described by two historians, who stated: "[lP]ublic education
must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . . . ."

-Bethel School Districtv. Fraser(1986)204
Interest in the mental health of ... students falls well within the
state's authority as parenspatriae [and] . . . may legitimately play a

role in the care and nurture of children entrusted to [it] for
schooling.
-Fields v. Palmdale (2005)205

200. Id. at 181.
201. Id. at 179 (emphasis in text).
202. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 386 (6th Cir. 2005). The court ultimately
held that "issues of public education are generally 'committed to the control of state and local
authorities.'" Id. at 396.
203. See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
204. 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATEs 228 (1968)) (alterations in original).

205. 427 F.3d 1197, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Public schools today prepare students for citizenship by inculcating
liberal values and by managing their mental, physical, and sexual health.206
This Part demonstrates how mandated dress codes,207 liberal education,20 8
diversity, 209 and community service 2 10 have been upheld and commended
by courts as crucial to shaping future citizens of the state. Courts have also
found that techniques such as mandatory health surveys, 211 health
education classes, 212 HIV education programs, 213 and voluntary condomdistribution programs are necessary for the health of the population. 2 14
Such techniques are understood by courts as non-coercive.215
Melissa Murray and Alice Ristroph have critiqued "the use of state
power to encourage or discourage particular visions of the family." 21 6 The
authors rely on principles of anti-totalitarianism to make a strong case for
"disestablishing the family. 1 7 By this they mean that the government
should refrain from encouraging certain family forms while discouraging
others. Murray and Ristroph center their discussion on a range of
constitutional challenges to state regulation of families decided by the
Supreme Court.218 Interestingly, in opting-out disputes after Yoder, an
indirect and less apparent form of governing the family emerges: the state
shapes the values and health of its future citizens by mandating health,
sexuality, and liberal education in public schools.2 19

206. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681 (observing that public schools "'inculcate the habits and manners
of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovernment in the community and the nation."') (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEw BASIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).

207. Littlefield v. Forney, 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001); Blau, 401 F.3d 381.
208. Mozert v. Hawkins Crnty. Bd. ofEduc., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987).
209. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
210. Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996).
211. Fields v. Palmdale, 427 F.3d 1197, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.,
430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
212. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
213. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
214. Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995); see also RICHARD H.
THALER &

CASS

R. SUNSTEIN,

NUDGE:

IMPROVING

DECISIONS

ABOUT HEALTH,

WEALTH

&

HAPPINESS 1-3 (2009) (discussing the ordering of items on school cafeteria lines).
215. Thaler and Sunstein have called some of these techniques "nudging," which they define as
"any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives." THALER & SUNSTEIN,
supranote 214, at 6.
216. Ristroph & Murray, supranote 103, at 1241.
217. Id.
218. Their examples include Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1992); Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491
U.S. 110 (1989); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975
(2012); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
219. See also MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 105 (2009) ("What can
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Monitoring, improving, surveying, and nudging do not appear to
today's courts as coercive.22 0 The narrow interpretation of the coercion
standard by courts has led to one-sided judicial outcomes favoring schools
in opting-out disputes. 2 2 1 The heavy-handed idea of coercion that courts
use as a baseline is forceful state regulation, such as prohibiting the study
of a language or mandating public school attendance. Courts typically
defer to public schools unless "the governmental action is mandatory and
provides no outlet for the parents."22 2 That is, where the state is "requiring
or prohibiting" an activity. 223 This is the legacy of the anti-totalitarian
frame of Meyer and Pierce. Today's dissenting families often fail to meet
this formidable standard.224 Thus a new understanding of familial liberty is
needed. Part III offers this understanding through a framework that I call
"family laws," which responds to recent legislative developments in the
wake of the courts' retrenchment.
C. Legislative Discontent
State legislatures have begun to show signs of dissatisfaction with this
judicial trend. Most recently, in January of 2012, the New Hampshire
legislature passed a bill that allows parents "to request an alternative
school curriculum for any subject to which they register an objection."22 5
This legislation immediately sparked a national debate about the role of
public schools and the extent to which families should be able to shape
their children's curriculum. 226

the end of government be? Certainly not to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to
increase its wealth, its longevity and its health. And the instruments that government will use to obtain
these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting directly on the
population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people
being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flow of the population to this or that activity.").
220. Cf THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 214, at 6 (defining a "nudge" as "any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or
significantly changing their economic incentives").
221. See Gilles, supra note 34 (arguing that the standard is deferential); see also Heather M.
Good, Comment, "The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution": The Parental Free Exercise Right to
Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 641 (2005).
222. Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 1995).
223. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980).
224. But see Arnold v. Bd. of Ed., 880 F.2d 305 (11 th Cir. 1989); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290
(3d Cir. 2000).
225. John Celock, New Hampshire Lawmakers Pass Law Allowing Parental Objections to
Curriculum, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/04/
new-hampshire-legislature-curriculum-objection-law n 1184476.html. See also H.B. 542, 2011 Gen.
Ct., 162d Sess. (N.H. 2012). The bill was passed as part of a veto override.
226. See, e.g, Celock, supra note 225; see also Room for Debate, Should Parents Control What
Kids Learn at School?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/01/
24/should-parents-control-what-kids-learn-at-school.
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But the New Hampshire legislation is not a peculiar outlier. Several
other states have enacted similar legislation offering more robust
protection of familial liberties. A Minnesota statute, for example, sets up a
"parental curriculum review" that enables a "parent, guardian, or adult
student [who] objects to the content, to make reasonable arrangements
with school personnel for alternative instruction."22 7 This legislation also
clarifies that schools will not bear the cost of such alternative
instruction. 2 28 Likewise, a Nebraska statute requires all public school
districts in the state to develop and adopt policies that would "involve
parents in the schools and [state] what parents' rights shall be relating to
access to the schools, testing information, and curriculum matters."2 29 In
particular, the policy must include the circumstances under which "parents
may ask that their children be excused from testing, classroom instruction,
and other school experiences the parents may find objectionable."23 0 Still
other states have created narrower opting-out regimes that target only part
of the curriculum, such as health education or "family life instruction."23 1

227. MINN. STAT. § 120B.20 (2010) ("Each school district shall have a procedure for a parent,
guardian, or an adult student, 18 years of age or older, to review the content of the instructional
materials to be provided to a minor child or to an adult student and, if the parent, guardian, or adult
student objects to the content, to make reasonable arrangements with school personnel for alternative
instruction. Alternative instruction may be provided by the parent, guardian, or adult student if the
alternative instruction, if any, offered by the school board does not meet the concerns of the parent,
guardian, or adult student."); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §26.010 (West 2006) (Exemption From
Instruction) ("A parent is entitled to remove the parent's child temporarily from a class or other school
activity that conflicts with the parent's religious or moral beliefs if the parent presents or delivers to
the teacher of the parent's child a written statement authorizing the removal of the child from the class
or other school activity. A parent is not entitled to remove the parent's child from a class or other
school activity to avoid a test or to prevent the child from taking a subject for an entire semester.").
228. § 120B.20 ("The school board is not required to pay for the costs of alternative instruction
provided by a parent, guardian, or adult student. School personnel may not impose an academic or
other penalty upon a student merely for arranging alternative instruction under this section. School
personnel may evaluate and assess the quality of the student's work.").
229. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-531 (2008) (Parental involvement; public school district; adopt
policy).
230. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-532 (2008) (Parental involvement; policy; contents).
231. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-50 (West 2004) ("Pursuant to policies and guidelines adopted
by the local school board, public school principals shall develop a method of notifying parents of
students in the relevant grades of the content of the instructional materials concerning reproductive
health, family life, pregnancy prevention, and of their option to exempt their child from this
instruction, and sexually transmitted diseases if instruction in the diseases is presented as a separate
component . . .. No student must be penalized as a result of an exemption. School districts shall use
procedures to ensure that students exempted from the program by their parents or guardians are not
embarrassed by the exemption."); see also ALA. CODE § 16-41-6 (2001) (Religious conflicts) ("Any
child whose parent presents to the school principal a signed statement that the teaching of disease, its
symptoms, development and treatment and the use of instructional aids and materials of such subjects
conflict with the religious teachings of his church shall be exempt from such instruction, and no child
so exempt shall be penalized by reason of such exemption."); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-16e (West
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Interestingly, these laws reinstate the former relationship between
public schools and families struck by courts in the common-law era: the
232family is once again deemed supreme in opting-out
disputes.
Families
are vested with broad discretion in matters of education and can opt out of
the public school curriculum for many reasons. By effectively
circumventing holdings such as Leebaert,233 Mozert, 234 Fields,235 and
236 these statutes signal public dissatisfaction with the treatment of
Parker,
familial liberties in federal courts.
Are these legislative schemes desirable? Does the state have any
legitimate interest in mandating certain health and liberal instruction of its
future adult citizens? Part III presents an alternative proposal that offers a
middle way between the absolute liberties that some state legislatures have
vested in parents, and the near absence of such liberties in the opting-out
jurisprudence of the last four decades. The proposal turns on what I call
the "Lawmaking Family."
III. EMPOWERING THE LAWMAKING FAMILY

The rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law,
and the conventions of a social order are, indeed, important ... ;
they are, however, but a small part of the normative universe that
ought to claim our attention.

-Robert Cover 237

2010) ("[N]o student shall be required ... to participate in any ... family life program which may be
offered within such public schools."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:35-4.7 (West 1999) ("Any child whose
parent or guardian presents to the school principal a signed statement that any part of the instructions
in health, family life education or sex education is in conflict with his conscience, or sincerely held
moral or religious beliefs shall be excused from that portion of the course where such instruction is
being given and no penalties as to credit or graduation shall result therefrom."); TENN. CODE ANN.
§49-6-1303 (2009) ("(a) Upon receipt of a written statement from a student's parent or guardian to the
effect that the parent or guardian has personally examined the appropriate grade level instructional
materials or has conferred directly with the student's instructor, school counselor or principal and that
the parent or guardian finds objectionable any or all portions of family life instruction, the student shall
be excused from such portion or portions of family life instruction."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 134
(2004) ("Any pupil whose parent shall present to the school principal a signed statement that the
teaching of disease, its symptoms, development and treatment, conflicts with the parents' religious
convictions shall be exempt from such instruction, and no child so exempt shall be penalized by reason
of that exemption.").
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
234. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
235. 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
236. 514 F.3d 87, 97 (1st Cir. 2008).
237. Cover, supranote 13, at 4.
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It is time for a more nuanced discussion of familial liberty. Ideas about
liberty and coercion in Meyer and Pierce are anachronistic today. School
governance has changed. Express prohibitions, such as those challenged in
Meyer and Pierce, rarely arise in contemporary disputes. New techniques
of governance include managing the health, sexuality, and liberal
development of students through surveys, nudges, and mandatory
readings. This Part offers schools, legislators, and courts a new framework
to limit these techniques. This framework is based on a concept of "family
laws."
A. What are "Family Laws"?
We have seen that scholars and courts have so far understood optingout conflicts as questions of authority or supremacy, and that this has led
to binary legal outcomes. In the common-law era, courts viewed the
family as supreme, and the teacher was understood to be primarily a
service provider. By contrast, in the past four decades, courts have viewed
the state as legitimately governing the health and values of its future
citizens. But what if instead of asking who should have greater authority,
we ask what is at stake for the dissenting family?
Consider the following example. A vegetarian family seeks to exempt a
child from a nutrition class in which the killing of animals is treated
uncritically. We do not yet know the reason for the family's request. The
family could be trying to avoid exposure to materials that violate a
vegetarian norm of non-violence towards animals. But the family could
also be seeking to exempt the child because the child has a hard time
waking up for early morning classes or because the family does not like
the teacher's teaching style or because the child thinks it's icky to dissect a
frog. Should it matter if the family's request to opt out of the mandatory
nutrition class is based on a familial norm, a child's habits, a mere
preference, or something else? Under some of the new legislative optingout proposals, it would not matter; this Part argues that it should.
Our religious, ethical, and moral convictions are central to our
existence and our understanding of who we are, in ways that preferences
and habits are not. This Article offers a theory that would help schools,
courts, and legislators systematize and empower these zones of familial
lawmaking in the context of opting-out disputes.
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Jurists and legal philosophers have been deciphering concepts of "law"
and "legality" for decades. 238 But laws and legalities generated by formal
state institutions are only "a small part of the normative universe that
ought to claim our attention." 23 9 There are many kinds of familial norms,
but not all of them are included in what I call "family laws." 2 40 A family
norm should be treated as a family law if it is: (1) general and articulable;
(2) grounded in religion, ethics, or morality; and (3) perceived as binding
by members of a particular family. 24 1 When these three conditions are
satisfied, a family law is in place. I will explain each part of the test in
turn.
1. General andArticulable Norms
To qualify as a family law, a norm should be specific enough to
prescribe or prohibit action and general enough to be applicable in future
situations. 242 A standard such as "be nice to others" is probably too vague
to be considered a family law because it does not convey enough
specificity about what actions must be undertaken to comply. Likewise, a
rule that by its own terms applies only occasionally, such as "we
sometimes recycle because we care about the environment," is not general
enough to constitute a family law.
Family laws may regulate a variety of activities and behaviors. They
could regulate, for instance, how family members contract, or how they
fulfill duties of love and care towards each other. Family laws could also
guarantee equality among family members. Consider, for example, a rule
that permits family members to enter into agreements with other family
members regarding household duties ("I will clean the dishes now if you
change the baby's diaper later"), but prohibits such agreements if they
involve monetary exchange ("I will pay you five dollars if you change the
baby's diaper"); or a tort-like rule that requires family members to warn

238. Legal Positivists historically separated the concept of law from morality and defined law as
an enforceable command by a sovereign who can rule others but is not ruled by them. See, e.g., JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1998). H.L.A. Hart refined Austin's theory

with a theory of primary and secondary rules, arguing that the rule of recognition is a primary rule that
helps identify law. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (1961). See also SCOTT J. SHAPIRO,

LEGALITY (2011) (proposing a theory of law as plans).
239. Cover, supra note 13, at 4 (arguing that insular communities create and interpret laws that
deserve state protection, and identifying three characteristics of the laws of insular communities:
(1) commitment; (2) objectification; and (3) dedication).
240. For a discussion of non-state actors as lawmakers, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal
Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 577 (2000) (exploring how
Indian tribal judges constitute their tribe's unique culture in the domain of family dispute resolution).
241. For a discussion of the issue of dissent within the family, see infra Part Ill.B.1.
242. HART, supranote 238, at 200-13.
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other family members about potential dangers no matter how remote or
unlikely to occur; or an antidiscrimination rule that prohibits all gender
stereotyping in the family. Of course, the point is not that the existence of
an articulable family norm should result in the enforcement of
idiosyncratic contract and tort rules by courts, but rather that families
create and live by legal norms regardlessof their enforceability by formal
institutions of law. Families sometimes inhabit a legal universe that is not
coextensive with that of the state. In opting-out disputes, families are often
asking that they not be forced to participate in programs or activities that
violate their family laws.
2. Grounded in Religion, Ethics, or Morality
The second characteristic of a family law is that it is grounded in
ethical, moral, or religious principles.243 As described in Part II, religious
"ways of life" currently receive greater protection than secular ones.244
Thus, a parent who today offers a secular justification for opting-out of a
program or policy, as in Blau245 (opposing a dress code on secular
grounds) and Herndon24 6 (opposing mandatory community service), stands
a lesser chance of success than a parent who offers a religiousjustification
for opting out, as in Needville247 (successfully opposing a grooming policy
on religious grounds) and Arnold248 (successfully opposing school
intervention in teen pregnancy on religious grounds).

243. Whereas my proposal does not discriminate among family laws that are ethical, moral or
religious, courts in the past have had to decide whether "secular" ethical or moral commitments should
be treated on par with religious commitments for specific purposes. For example, in the context of a
draft exemption for conscientious objectors in the Vietnam War, the Court broadly defined the term
"religion," to include ethical and moral motives that do not stem from any founded religion. See
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (defining the term "religious" under the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.S. § 456(j) to include "A sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly
qualifying for the exemption."); But see Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (observing
in the case of a federal prisoner whose request to form humanist groups within the prison chapel was
denied, that "traditional notions of religion surely would not include humanism. 'The term "religion"
has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will."' (internal citation omitted). I thank
Nancy Knauer for pointing me to this line of cases.
244. On the relationship between religious and non-religious conscience, see generally Nathan S.
Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2012 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming).
245. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005).
246. Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996).
247. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010).
248. Arnold v. Bd. ofEduc., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989).
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One of the novelties of this alternative scheme is that when a family
norm is general and articulable, it should not matter whether it is religious
or secular. This is because what religious values mean to some families,
secular values may mean to others. The state grants legal protection to
religious values because of their significance to families, not because they
are inherently true (that, state law has no tools to assess). Non-religious
ethical or moral systems deserve similar respect. In constitutional terms, it
should not matter whether a family law is invoked under the Free Exercise
Clause (as in Yoder) or the Due Process Clause (as in Meyer and
Pierce).249 A religious family prohibition could require, for example, that
"no family member eat on Yom Kippur," whereas a secular prohibition
could require that "no family member eat or wear animal products." A
religious obligation could require that "all family members pray five times
a day," and a secular obligation could require that "all family members
must recycle plastic containers to protect mother earth." Both types of
prohibitions and obligations can qualify as family laws, if they meet the
criteria set out here.
A family preference or habit is distinguishable from a family law. A
family may gravitate toward Blues over Bach; Earl Gray over espresso;
Winnie the Pooh over Alice in Wonderland; Thai food over Italian food; or
as in Blau, "nice clothes" over a school uniform.250 Such preferences and
habits should not be treated as family laws for the purpose of opting-out
disputes. Individuals and family members suffer a special kind of injury
when religious, moral, or ethical convictions are disregarded by the state.
This harm is distinguishable from harms that are caused when a mere
preference or habit is disregarded, and is thus worthy of the special
attention of lawmakers proposed here.
3. Perceivedby Family Members as Binding
The final characteristic of a family law is that it should be understood
by family members as binding.251 It is not enough that family members
follow a certain rule. They must do so because they feel bound by it, such
that a family member who breaches a family law can be viewed as
blameworthy or lawless.252 In Yoder, as Robert Cover points out, if the
Amish families had followed the Amish principles only because it was

249. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 53435 (1925); Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
250. Blau, 401 F.3d at 386.
251. But see discussion of dissenting family members infra Part IIB. 1.
252. See Cover, supra note 13, at 45.
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enjoyable to do so, they would not have disobeyed any principle if they
had abandoned the Amish way of life, and thus "they could not hold
someone blameworthy-lawless-were he to give in. ,,253 Likewise, iin
A.A. 25 4 the Fifth Circuit granted a Native American family an exemption
from a grooming policy because the child and the family demonstrated a
sincere religious belief in wearing the boy's hair uncovered and visibly
long.255 If the Native American plaintiff in A.A. had followed the
haircutting principles typical among Native Americans only because it was
pleasurable or aesthetically pleasing to do so, he would probably not have
prevailed in court and those principles would not constitute a family law
as the term is used here.
The same principle should apply when the family law at stake is based
on secular ethics or morality.256 Consider, for instance, the plaintiff-mother
in Miller257 who refused to expose her teenage daughter to a program filled
with gender-stereotyping messages about promiscuous female sexuality.258
To establish a family law here, the mother would have to show not only
that her opposition to gender stereotyping stems from an ethical
commitment to a set of feminist principles, but also that by sending her
daughter to such a learning environment she would in fact compromise her
family law of gender equality. That is, that doing so would make her feel
lawless or blameworthy.
Or consider a secular thank-you-note-writing family. Thank-you notes
are obviously extremely unlikely to trigger opting-out disputes,259 but the
example is nonetheless conceptually helpful. Assume that a family rule
that requires the writing of thank-you notes is based on an ethical
commitment to express gratitude and familial love. Such a rule would be
considered a family law under the proposed approach if the family
members also viewed themselves as bound by the rule. In other words, if

253. Id.
254. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010).
255. Id. at 272 (deciding the case on state free exercise grounds).
256. Obviously, secular family laws cannot be the basis of First Amendment free exercise
challenges, but they can be brought under the Due Process Clause, as was the case in Meyer, Pierce,
and many other challenges examined above. See supra note 249.
257. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
258. Id. (holding that the district attorney violated a mother's fundamental right to raise her child
without undue state interference).
259. It is interesting to imagine, however, an opting-out dispute involving a parent who wanted to
opt her child out of a class discussion of anthropological critiques of gift exchange. See, e.g., MARCEL
MAUSS, THE GIFT (2000) (arguing that gifts in most cultures give rise to reciprocal exchange);
ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993).
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thank-you-note rule violators are considered lawless or blameworthy, a
family law may exist under the proposed approach.
Family laws are importantly distinguishable from "social norms."
Social norms are rules of behavior that individuals follow independent of
any formal legal obligation or official sanction for non-compliance.26 0
Thus, under the framework offered here, social norms should be classified
as habits or mere preferences and not as family laws. Clare Huntington has
recently argued that "[social] norms particularly shape the relationships
and intimate decisions that fall within the ambit of family law."261
Huntington nicely demonstrates that the state can potentially influence
various "familial social norms" such as a visibly pregnant woman's
decision to refrain from ordering a glass of wine in a restaurant, a parent's
decision to discipline a child in public, or the decision of a closeted person
to bring her female partner to the office holiday party. 262 Family laws and
social norms may sometimes overlap, but the key difference is that the
commitment to family laws is generally greater and perceived by family
members as more binding than the choice whether or not to follow a social
norm.
In sum, a family law is in place if a dissenting family can establish that
a given familial norm is (1) general and articulable; (2) grounded in
religion, ethics, or morality; and (3) perceived as binding by members of a
particular family.
B. Limiting Principles
There are three important qualifications to the liberty to opt out
proposed here. First, dissenting family members should be entitled to an
independent decision-making process, regardless of the opting-out
requests of parents. Second, violent family laws should not trigger the
liberty to opt out. Third, the liberty to opt out is negative by nature, and
thus does not cover more intrusive remedies. I will briefly discuss each
qualification.

260. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining social norms as "informal social regularities that individuals
feel obligated to follow"); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
914 (1996) (defining social norms as "social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what
ought to be done and what ought not to be done").
261. Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.. 1103, 1105 (2010); see
also Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REv. 1901
(2000).
262. Huntington, supra note 261, at 1105.
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1. FamilialDissent
In articulating a liberty for the jurisgenerative activities of families,
there is an important complicating factor: the internal dissenters who may
challenge family laws and the status quo from within. Empowering
lawmaking families without recognizing these inside warriors of changeor just uncommitted bystanders-may have undesirable, or even
devastating, effects. As Madhavi Sunder has argued, "[1]egally enforced
cultural boundaries could, conceivably, accord powerful members of
cultural groups the ability to suppress any rumblings for change in a
culture, particularly by censoring or excluding those members who
challenge power relationships within a culture and threaten the status
quo."263 Sunder criticizes the fact that "law remains steadfastly committed
to the old-world view of cultural diversity as existing across cultures, but
not within them."264 Similar concerns certainly apply in the smaller social
-- 265
units of lawmaking families.
The liberty to opt out should be conditioned on alignment between the
student and his or her family. As we saw in Part II, students and parents
often bring joint claims against schools, and are often (or at least appear to
be) of one mind. But there will be times when a student does not wish to
opt out of a school activity or program, and the parent or guardian does,or
vice versa. Imagine, for example, a child who wants to participate in frog
dissection classes despite parental objections. Or a child who wishes to opt
out of frog dissection classes, despite parental wishes for the child to
participate in such classes2.266 In such cases of individual dissent, the
student's autonomy (auto-nomy, literally self-legislating) should prevail .267
Thus, if a child dissents from a familial opting-out request, the parental
request should be dismissed.26 8

263. Madhavi Sunder, CulturalDissent, 54 STAN. L. REv. 495, 503 (2001).
264. Id. at 500 ("The 'right to associate,' the 'right to culture,' the 'right to religion,' and other
laws are interpreted to defend cultural groups against the forces of modernization and change.").
265. Instead of what Sunder views as the prevalent "cultural survival" approach, Sunder favors an
approach of "cultural dissent." Id. at 500-01; see also Janet E. Halley, Culture Constrains, in Is
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 100, 103-04 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., Princeton University

Press 1999).
266. I thank Chapin Cimino for offering this example.
267. A similar principle applies here. Just as dissenting families should possess the liberty to
dissent from mandated state education, dissenting individual family members should possess the
liberty to dissent from mandated family laws.
268. If a child individually wishes to opt out of a program or policy, against parental wishes to the
contrary, a different grounding principle may be necessary. In a current work in progress entitled
"Cultivating Thinking," I further develop the premise of lawmaking individuals.
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While detecting cultural dissent may prove a difficult task for judges,
the school setting may offer resources for detecting and empowering
dissenters. Thus, when a family seeks an opt-out based on a family law,
the inquiry would ideally begin with an age-appropriate evaluation by
guidance counselors or other professionals, assessing the particular family
and its norms, and how the individual child relates to those
commitments. 269 This inquiry should help the school, and later the court, if
needed, to determine if the family's law warrants the liberty to opt out.
2. Violent Family Laws
Not all family laws should trigger the liberty to opt out. A family law
that supports violence against others should not trigger a family's liberty
to opt out. Consider the following examples: A family wishes to excuse a
child from classes about the Civil War because the family believes that
forced slavery is morally superior to equal citizenship; a family wishes to
opt out of Holocaust education based on a family law that favors killing
Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and people with disabilities; a family wishes
to opt out of reading about transgender people because it believes in
bullying and shaming transgender children; a family wishes to opt out of
sex education classes because it believes that promiscuous women deserve
to be sexually abused. Even if such families can establish the existence of
a family law, the liberty to opt out should not be granted in such cases2 0
There are at least two justifications for excluding violent family laws.
First, the second part of the proposed family-laws test involves laws that
are religious, ethical, or moral.271 Family laws that preach hatred and
violence rarely can be grounded on religion, ethics, or morality. Thus, they
may not qualify as family laws to begin with.272 The vast majority of
religious, ethical, and moral systems have a general requirement of otherregardingness, usually reflected in a host of more concrete obligations.
Individual deviations lack grounding in these traditions, and thus are likely
to lack the regularity of a law. Second, when family laws advocate
violence against others, there is a reason to worry that children raised in
such families may indeed harm others. Refusing an opt-out request in such

269. The norms guiding these professionals would probably have to be rules rather than standards
if we wish to avoid alliance with maiority values and dismissal of family laws that do not appeal to the
evaluating professional.
270. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
271. See supra Part Ill.A.2.
272. However, there may be family laws that are offensive and should nonetheless merit opting
out.
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situations may help to cultivate internal dissent within violent families,
and at the same time possibly protect potential victims of violence.
3. Non-Invasiveness
The liberty to opt out proposed here does not carry with it any
prerogative to change or alter the curriculum for other children. It only
enables a temporary exit, a "time-out" by choice, for students whose
family laws conflict with a given program or policy. Courts have
repeatedly dismissed opting-out claims based on the notion that parents
cannot "prescribe the curriculum." 273 This language is misguided.
Dissenting families rarely sue in courts attempting to "prescribe" the
curriculum. They seek to opt out. This Article argues that, subject to three
limiting principles, they should possess the liberty to do so.
Dissenting families may sometimes seek a remedy that is more robust
than an opt-out. Consider for example condom machines. Even if
dissenting families can demonstrate that condom machines seriously
offend family laws regarding sexual abstinence, there is no meaningful
way to enable dissenters to opt out without burdening the architecture of
the school and the lives of other students.274 Likewise, because school
cafeterias usually do not offer enough vegetarian options, vegetarian
children often end up bringing their own lunch.275 By bringing their own
lunch, these students are already exercising the liberty to opt out of eating
cafeteria food. Dissenting families in both examples would not be able to
utilize this proposal beyond an inherent liberty that they can already
exercise, that is, the choice not to obtain condoms or eat cafeteria food.
C. Implications of the Liberty to Opt Out
By strengthening the liberty of lawmaking families to opt out,
lawmakers could breathe new life into the liberty professed by Meyer and
Pierce.276 This Article argues, with some qualifications discussed above,
273. See supra Part II.C.
274. See, e.g, Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995).
275.
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HANDBOOK 176 (Three Rivers Press 2001) ("School cafeterias. Assume nothing. From preschool to

high school, the choices may be very limited. Bringing lunches will be your best option. If you wish to
make some changes, contact EarthSave and find out about their school-lunch campaign.").
276. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc't of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In
these two cases, the Court expressed an aversion to the idea of the state producing "ideal citizens" at
the cost of familial liberty. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 ("That the State may do much, go very far, indeed,
in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the
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that a dissenting family today should be granted the liberty to opt out when
its family laws conflict with a public school mandatory program or policy.
Notably, for religious families, recognition of the liberty to opt out of
aspects of public school education is already on the rise: it is increasingly
created through new state and local legislative initiatives. 27 7 This Article
offers a theory to explain and qualify this legislative development, and
argues that it should apply to families associated with the political left as
well.
We now turn to three representative types of familial lawmaking:
(1) religious; (2) feminist; and (3) vegetarian. For all three types, this
Article argues, the establishment of a family law would trigger the liberty
to opt out of mandatory programs and policies, subject to the limitations
described above. We will now see how the proposed approach would
affect outcomes of past and future opting-out disputes.
1. Religious Family Laws
Given the secularization of public schools throughout the twentieth
century, much contemporary opting-out litigation involves religious
dissent.278 Part II argued that courts currently lack effective tools to
address religious family laws. We have also seen that state legislatures
share this insight and are gradually stepping in to fill that gap.2 79 Several
cases involving religious dissent provide useful examples for the
application of the family-laws framework.
In Leebaert,280 a father sought to excuse his child, who was in the
seventh grade at the time, from mandatory health-education classes. 281 The
father explained in an affidavit how the contested health curriculum
conflicted with his sincerely held religious beliefs: 2 82
While I do not belong to any institutionalized religion, I have
religious beliefs which incorporate, in my view, the best from all
religions.... [C]hildren should be taught just do not engage in
drugs or tobacco.

. .

. [M]y religious view on sex before marriage is

that it is something I do not want my sons to be involved in. I teach

individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 ("The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children . . .
277. See discussion supra Part II.C.
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. See supra Part II.C.
280. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
281. Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 135.
282. Id. at 137-38.
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them abstention because my religious view is that sex should be
reserved for marriage when it is appropriate.... I believe that the
way the school system teaches the subjects to which I sought to opt
my son out of, is anti-religion. For one example, it doesn't support a
married man and woman together as the basic unit of the family.
The school teaches that this unit can be comprised of anything or
anyone, that anything you say can be a family. This contradicts my
religious beliefs.283
The father's affidavit satisfies the three elements of a family law. First, the
norms cited are general and articulable: children should be warned rather
than educated about tobacco and alcohol; sex should be reserved for
marriage; and only a man and a woman can form a family. Second, these
norms are grounded in religion. The plaintiff claims to incorporate "the
best from all religions," but considers himself mostly Christian.2 84 Third,
the plaintiff views himself as bound by these norms and would deem
himself lawless and blameworthy if he failed to educate his son according
to them.285 Nonetheless, under the narrowly construed coercion standard,
the Second Circuit denied the family's attempt to opt out. 2 86 Under the
scheme proposed in this Article, the Leebaert father and son would have
been granted the liberty to opt out of the health curriculum.
Parker and Mozert prompt a similar analysis. 8 In both of these cases
parents objected to mandatory readings in public schools that offended
general and articulable religious family rules that family members
probably viewed as binding. In Parker, the family laws involved a
family's commitment to heterosexual unions. 288 This commitment may
have been reflected in a family law that prohibits reading books such as
289
King and King to children. In Mozert, the parents invoked a wide range
of family laws, such as a commitment to traditional gender roles, a

283. Id.
284. Id. ("The basis of my religious beliefs is Christian, I consider myself to be a Christian and I
was baptized a Catholic.").
285. Id. at 138 ("I believe that God has empowered human beings with the right to bring their
children up with correct moral principles in dealing with the issues taught in this course, not the school
system. I claim the right, and responsibility, to impart those religious values which I have been taught
to my children to develop their moral, ethical and religious character.").
286. Id. at 145.
287. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008); Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
288. Parker,514 F.3d at 92.
289.

LINDA DE HAAN & STERN NIJLAND, supra note 181 (telling a children's story in which a

prince does not like any of the princesses brought before him, but falls in love with one princess's
brother and lives happily ever after).
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commitment not to question the existence of God by teaching evolution,
and a commitment not to question the killing of animals. 290 Likewise, in
Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions,291 parents and students alleged, in the
context of a mandatory HIV-awareness program, that the school's
"endorsement and encouragement of sexual promiscuity at a mandatory
assembly 'imping[ed] on
their sincerely held religious values regarding
292
morality."'
and
chastity
Plaintiffs in Leebaert, Parker, Mozert, and Hot, Sexy & Safer
Productions, all of whom were unsuccessful in federal courts under the
courts' narrow construction of Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, would satisfy the
family-laws test for similar reasons. 293 Plaintiff families pointed to specific
family laws that conflicted with a mandated public school teaching.
Religion served as the basis for objection, and the family expressed
attitudes of deep commitment to their religious family laws. Thus, subject
to the limits above, the liberty to opt out would be available to all these
plaintiffs under the proposed scheme.
Not all religious dissenters would prevail however. It seems that
parents such as those in Fields294 and C.N.295 may not satisfy the familylaws test. In Fields, elementary school children were questioned about a
range of topics including sexuality.296 The parents invoked their religious
faith and claimed that they possessed the liberty to direct the education of
their children in all matters regarding sexuality.297 But they did not
demonstrate any specific familial ethical, religious, or moral laws.298
These parents were only asserting a right to control certain aspects of
education. Likewise, in C.N ,299 parents complained that their children's
participation in a survey involving issues such as drug and alcohol use,
sexual activity, suicide, and personal associations, intruded upon their
parental authority to decide when and how to introduce their children to

290. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062.
291. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
292. Id. at 537 (alterations in original).
293. Likewise, the Native-American family in Needville would easily establish the existence of a
religious family law that is violated by a strict grooming policy. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist.,
611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010).
294. Fields v. Palmdale, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
295. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
296. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1200. The questioning was part of a survey regarding psychological
barriers to learning, and the parents learned of the sexual nature of some of the questions on the survey
when their children informed them of the questions after they had completed the questionnaires. Id
297. Id. at 1202.
298. Id. at 1203.
299. C.N, 430 F.3d 159.
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these topics. 30 0 Again, these parents did not invoke existing family laws. 3 0 1
In such cases, the state's interest in the health and education of its citizens
may prevail, and parents would not have the liberty to opt out. Thus, these
two cases would probably not have come out differently, and the parents
still would have lost under the proposed family-laws framework.
We will sometimes agonize over the outcomes of this liberty. Some
families will seek to opt out of learning about ethical and moral issues that
may be dear to our hearts, such as sexual pluralism, reproductive rights, or
civil liberties. 302 There may also be real harms to the confidence and selfesteem of children when they learn why their classmates have opted out of
certain educational programs.30 3 But regardless of whether society blames
or praises the content of any given family law, an honest social and legal
commitment to liberty, pluralism, and diversity demands that family laws
be taken seriously. 304
2. FeministFamily Laws
Feminist family laws offer another domain of familial lawmaking. This
Article argues that when public school education conflicts with a feminist
family law, the liberty to opt out should also be automatically triggered.
But first let us see how feminist family laws can satisfy the three-part test
above.
First, feminist family laws often generate an articulable set of rules or
principles. These rules and principles may vary, depending on the feminist
principles that family members are committed to. For example, an equality
principle may generate rules like equal sharing of childcare;3 05

300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Mozert, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); Leebaert, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003); Parker, 514
F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
303. Perhaps it is worthwhile for a child to experience real life consequences of liberty and
diversity rather than read about it. Recall, however, that the proposal includes limits on the sorts of
harms that will be tolerated through, for instance, the exclusion of violent family laws and of
accommodation that would reshape the curriculum for everyone.
304. Cf Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2005)
(arguing that "democracy sometimes benefits from having decisionmaking bodies that do not mirror
the underlying population, but instead encompass a wide range of compositions. Second-order
diversity involves variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them . . .").
305. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About
Where, Why andHow the Burden of Carefor Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1753
(2001).
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hyphenation of last names; 3 06 equal contribution to household chores; 30 7 or
related measures. An anti-subordination principle may generate rules
involving types of sexual activities that are outside the limits of the family,
such as bondage and sadomasochistic sex,308 or rules and principles
involving the hiring and pay of household labor.309 A sexual liberation
principle may involve radical honesty and sexual experimentation.3 Antigender stereotyping principles may involve a commitment to
nonconforming choices in children's toys, names, or dress.31 These
principles may even include encouraging children to choose their own
gender.3 12 Of course, these are only a few examples of feminist family
laws, and families can also combine any of the above or with religious or
vegetarian laws.
Second, feminist family laws are usually grounded in various ethical
commitments such as equality,313 anti-subordination, 3 14 ethics of care 315
sexual liberation,- 316 autonomy, 317 and social justice.318 The interpretive
enterprise of feminist family laws involves interrogations of these core
feminist principles out of a sense of commitment to the ethical systems
that they represent. For some families, these acts of interpretation provide
the foundation of a legal system that the family or household experiences
as an essential part of its existence-a part that family members cannot

306. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of
Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2007).
307. Id.
308. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
309. Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 81 (1997).

310. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence,
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (2004).

311. See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Strugglefor Intersex and Transsex
Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51 (2006).

312. Some families have gone as far as resisting the gendering of children altogether by not
revealing the child's biological sex to the outside world. See id.
313. Case, supra note 29.
314. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND

LAW (Harvard University Press 1987); ANDREA DWORKIN, LIFE AND DEATH: UNAPOLOGETIC
WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR AGAINST WOMEN (1997).
315.

See,

e.g., CAROL

GILLIGAN,

IN A DIFFERENT

VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL

THEORY AND

WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (Harvard University Press 1993); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE
(1999);

MARTHA

A.

FINEMAN,

THE NEUTERED
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SEXUAL
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AND

OTHER

TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).

316. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The DomesticatedLiberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399 (2004); Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT

LAW (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., Yale University Press 2004); Gayle Rubin,
Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexualiy, in PLEASURE AND DANGER
(Carole Vance ed., 1984).
317. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 1999).
318. FINEMAN, supranote 315.
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live without. Finally, family members often feel bound by feminist family
laws, and violating such laws can often be perceived as blameworthy or
lawless. Mary Anne Case has aptly called such ethical commitments
"feminist fundamentalism." 31 9 Just like religious family laws, a conflict
between a mandatory school program and a feminist family law may be
experienced as a violation of one's core beliefs, ethics, or morals.
Consider two recent opting-out conflicts involving feminist family laws
and public education. In Miller,3 20 after a female teen who had "sexted" a
photo of herself was caught, her mother resisted a gender-education
program that would teach her daughter about the perils of female sexual
permissiveness.321 The mother "object[ed] to the education program's
lessons in why the minors' actions were wrong, [and] what it means to be
a girl in today's society" and "[s]he particularly opposes these value
lessons from a District Attorney who has 'stated publicly that a teen[]age
girl who voluntarily posed for a photo wearing a swimsuit violated
Pennsylvania's child pornography statute."' 322 The mother claimed that
"the program's teachings that the minors' actions [sexting] were morally
'wrong' and created a victim contradict the beliefs and wishes she wished
to instill in her daughter." 323
The mother here would likely satisfy the family-laws test. First, she
specified an articulable and general feminist norm: the sexuality of girls
should not be perceived as dangerous or inappropriate because sexuality is
not in and of itself dangerous or immoral. Second, this sex-positive norm
can be seen as grounded in a certain strand of feminist ethics.324 Third, the
mother's commitment to feminist sex-positive principles seems to have
been conveyed throughout this litigation. She does not seem to be
following feminist rules because she finds them trendy or because she is
particularly supportive of "sexting." The mother's actions seem driven by
an actual commitment to feminist principles that she finds ethically
binding and wishes to raise her child by.

319. Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and
Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381, 382 (2009) (defining feminist
fundamentalism as "an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes as intense and at
least as worthy of respect as, for example, a religiously or culturally based commitment to female
subordination or fixed sex roles").
320. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 150.
323. Id.
324. See sources cited supranote 316.
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Therefore, this feminist mother would likely prevail under the familylaws scheme. Her claim would trigger the liberty to opt out of the
educational program that she is challenging. Indeed, the court agreed that
the district attorney could not "impose on . . . children his ideas of

morality and gender roles," and that the non-voluntary gender education
program violated the mother's right to direct the (feminist) upbringing of
her child. 325 Thus, Miller serves as an excellent example of a feminist
family law dealing with female sexual liberation and gender stereotyping
that triggered a right to opt out.
By contrast, a federal court has recently rejected a mother's feminist
challenge to sex-based segregation in a public school. 326 In Doe v.
Vermilion ParishSchool Board, a mother challenged the constitutionality
of a single-sex class policy in a school where two of her daughters
attended. The plaintiff claimed that sex-based segregation violates
constitutional and federal principles of equal protection.32' The court
denied her request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the board did
328
not intend to discriminate.
Would the alternative proposal offered here yield different results?
That depends on what the plaintiff sought to achieve in the lawsuit. On the
one hand, the mother could (and did) exempt her daughters from singlesex education. 32 9 This individual opt-out may be grounded in feminist
ethics. The mother could readily demonstrate her commitment to such
principles, and the harms she would suffer by their violation. Therefore, if
all the mother had sought was to opt out of mandatory sex segregation,
based on a family law, she would probably prevail under the proposed
standard. But here the mother attempted to invalidate the entire system.
She was not merely seeking to opt out. 3 30 Thus, the actual outcome of the
case may remain intact under the family-laws proposal offered here.

325. Miller, 598 F.3d at 151 (holding that the district attorney "impermissibly usurped and
violated [the mother's] fundamental right to raise her child without undue state interference").
326. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming
the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in Doe v. Vermilion ParishSchool Board, No.
6:09-CV-1565 (W.D. La. 2010)).
327. The mother claimed that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, various federal regulations implementing Title IX, and other laws. Id. at 368.
328. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., No. 6:09-CV-1565 (W.D. La. 2010). On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit held that the Equal Protection Clause does not require discriminatory intent, and remanded the
case to the lower court to determine questions of moomess and reconsider the constitutional claims.
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2011).
329. The board responded by making the single-sex classes voluntary, but the coed classes were
disproportionately filled with students with special needs and the single-sex classes had significantly
higher GPAs. Id. at 370. In addition, the school admitted to using different teaching techniques in the
single-sex classes to "tailor learning toward the strengths and needs of boys or girls." Id at 371.
330. The case is also distinguishable in that the mother was not invoking only a family law, but
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Another area where feminist family laws could trigger serious optingout conflicts with public schools involves gender non-conforming and
transgender children. As of today, several states already offer specific
protections for gender non-conforming children.3' Nonetheless, present
and future families may wish to opt out of a range of school policies, such
as dress and grooming codes, 332 restroom policies, 333 and choice of
name. 334 The commitment of families to their gender non-conforming
children often stems from feminist and queer ethics and from critical
attitudes towards societal policing of gender norms. Such families,
assuming they can satisfy the three-part test offered here, would be able
to exercise the liberty to opt out of school policies or programs that
mandate gender conformity.
3. Vegetarian Family Laws
How you live your vegetarian life can become a challenge because
of this conflict in meaning-we see death in their meals, they see it
in ours.
-Carol Adams, Living Among Meat Eaters33
Vegetarian families also create or adopt laws that can come into
conflict with public school education.3 Such laws can easily satisfy the
above characteristics of family laws. First, vegeterians often live by an
articulable set of rules or principles. A vegan outreach website, for
example, sets forth the following principle: "By not buying meat, eggs,
also state and federal laws about sex equality.
331. States with specific protections for transgender children in schools or public accommodations
include California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia. SCOPE OF
EXPLICITLY TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE DISCRIMINATION LAWS, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE

FOUND. (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact sheets/TI_ antidisclaws
7 08.pdf.
332. See, e.g, Doe v. Yunits, 15 MASS. L. RPTR. 278 (Mass. Super. 2001) (holding that a
transgender student had stated a viable sex-discrimination claim under state law).
333. See, e.g., Andy Run, "Which restroom should I use?" Challenges facing transgender
children in public schools, OFFBEAT MAMA (Sept. 6, 2011), http://offbeatmama.com/2011/09/whichrestroom-should-i-use-challenges-facing-transgender-children-in-public-schools.
334. See Noa Ben-Asher, Paradoxes of Health and Equality: When a Boy Becomes a Girl, 16
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 275 (2004) (discussing a case where a child with gender identity disorder was
forced against the child's gender of choice based on a certain understanding of mental health
advocated by a school and other state authorities).
335. This conclusion also assumes that none of the three limitations applies. See supra Part IlI.B.
336.
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HANDBOOK 6 (Three Rivers Press 2001).

337. In this part I discuss vegetarianism as the umbrella category of which veganism is a branch.
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and dairy products, we withdraw our support from cruelty to animals,
undertake an economic boycott of factory farms, and support the
production of cruelty-free foods." 338
Second, personal and community narratives of vegetarians involve
deep ethical convictions and a commitment to the interpretation of ideas
and texts involving these convictions. Many vegetarians share a range of
personal narratives about their transition from being meat eaters to being
vegetarians. These narratives often incorporate inspiring themes of
progression, ethicity, and personal development. 339 As with any legal
system, interpretation is essential to articulating vegetarian ethical
principles. Thus, while most vegetarian systems agree that a no-meat
eating rule is essential, opinions may vary on dairy products or plants. For
example, animal products are clearly proscribed for vegans3.340 Other
interpretive domains include the use of animals in cases of medical
necessity or the keeping of household pets. 3 4 1 These interpretations reflect
a commitment to a set of ethical ideas dealing with animal life.
Third, these norms are often experienced by family members as
binding. Many vegetarians choose to abstain from meat products because
they would otherwise violate ethical principles such that blameworthiness
and lawlessness would result. For example, one vegetarian complains
about meat eaters: "[t]hey simply don't understand that I don't miss meat
and I'd probably drop dead if I ate it." 342 This statement, which may not
capture the experience of all vegetarians, reflects a sentiment analogous to
that of the Amish in Yoder and many other religious believers: breaking
the law is an unimaginable way of living. Once a rule has been articulated,
it is perceived as binding and often immanent to one's self-perception as a
vegetarian.
Vegetarian family laws may come into conflict with public schools.
Consider two examples. First, classroom education about nutrition is a
classic situation where the liberty to opt out may be necessary for the
recognition and respect of vegetarian family laws. In the summer of 2011,
the federal government unveiled "MyPlate," a new guide to making

338. On Living ivith Compassion, VEGAN OUTREACH, http://www.veganoutreach.org/guide/being
vegan.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
339. ADAMS, supra note 336, at 6 ("To you, your vegetarianism is a natural progression in eating
habits and philosophy. To nonvegetarians, it represents a profound disjunction.").
340. Defining Vegan, VEGAN OUTREACH, http://www.veganoutreach.org/guide/definingvegan
.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
341. Id.
342. ADAMS, supra note 336, at 3 (quoting and discussing stories of collision from vegetarians).

HeinOnline -- 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 418 2012

20121

THE LAWMAKING FAMILY

419

healthier food choices.343 MyPlate emphasizes the fruit, vegetable, grains,
protein, and dairy food groups. Many of the elaborated protein options and
all of the dairy foods involve animal meat and products. Teaching school
children about the food groups typically involves the portrayal of animals
as legitimate sources of food. For many families this education is helpful
and welcome, but for vegetarian and vegan families it may be
devastating.34 4 Thus, some of these families choose to homeschool their
children. 345 Under the opting-out scheme proposed here, vegetarian
families would be able to opt out of any such educational program when
they meet the family-laws test. Perhaps such an opt-out regime would
draw some vegetarian families who home school their children back to the
public school system.
Second, the dissection of frogs and other animals in science classes has
triggered serious opting-out disputes. For example, in 1987 a lawsuit
ensued after a fifteen-year-old vegetarian student in California refused to
dissect a frog in biology class.346 The court ruled that mandatory
dissections were permissible, but that a student could ask to dissect a frog
that had died of natural causes.34 Many states today have laws that
recognize the rights of students to opt out of such dissections. 348 In line
with this trend, the opting-out scheme proposed here would enable all

343. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agriculture Secretary Launch MyPlate Icon as a
New Reminder to Help Consumers to Make Healthier Food Choices (June 2, 2011), http://www.cnpp
.usda.gov/Publications/MyPlate/PressRelease.pdf
344. Adams, for example, recounts a story in which her second grade child, who said during the
teaching of the food pyramid in class that he does not eat meat products, to which a classmate
responded that he would die without eating meat. ADAMS, supra note 275, at 4-5. Adams describes the
experience of explaining to her son why he is not dead and will not die despite the fact that he eats no
meat. Id.
345. Melanie Wilson, Homeschooling and the Vegan Family, VEGFAMILY: THE MAGAZINE FOR
VEGAN FAMILY LIVING, http://www.vegfamily.com/vegan-children/homeschooling.htm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2012) ("[A]llowing our children to learn at home gives us the opportunity to instill strong
vegetarian values without the conflict inherent in public school curriculum assignments related to
nutrition, health, animals, and the environment.").
346. PL's Ist Amend. Compl., Graham v. Bd. Trs. Victor Valley Union High Sch. Dist., CV-87
03764 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 15, 1987); see also F. BARBARA ORLANS ET AL., THE HUMAN USE OF

ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL CHOICE 210-13 (1998).
347. Id. However, the impracticality of obtaining such frogs in effect enabled the student to opt
out of the required dissection.
348. Such states include:
Florida, California, Pennsylvania, New York, Rhode Island, Illinois, Virginia, Oregon, New
Jersey and Vermont. Student-choice legislation is currently pending in Connecticut. Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts and New Mexico have Board of Education policies, and Louisiana
passed a state resolution in 1992. Many schools and school boards have also independently
enacted student-choice policies.
Questions and Answers About Dissection, THE HUMANE Soc'Y (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.humane
society.org/issues/dissection/qa/questions-answers.html.
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families, where they can demonstrate the existence of a family law that
opposes such dissections, to opt out of any such dissections.349
CONCLUSION

Almost a century has passed since the Supreme Court declared the
liberty of parents to educate their children in Meyer v. Nebraska.so Since
then, the quest for familial liberties has been transformed. Today, public
schools manage the health, happiness, and values of public school citizens
mostly through nudges, special educational programs, and surveys.
Obviously, this governance may be beneficial to many students and to the
general population. It is not intended as a means to repress children and
families. However, as a recent trend in legislation indicates, courts and
educators may need more guidance in finding the proper balance between
familial liberties and the state's interest in the health, happiness, and
values of its future citizens. A fine starting point for articulating this
balance would be the recognition and validation of the lawmaking family,
on the left and on the right.

349. Of course, such dissenting students could also dissent based on individual laws as well. The
framework of family laws, however, is helpful because it enables the more likely litigants in such
cases parents-to trigger the right on behalf of a child.
350. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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